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Misrepresentation and the FCC
Brian C. Murchison*
INTRODUCTION
Virtually since the beginning of radio and television licens-
ing, the Federal Communications Commission has encountered
the problem of misinformation.' Whether adjudicating cases
where a number of applicants compete for a valuable license, or
investigating viewer complaints about an existing station, the
Commission requires certain information from those appearing
before it.2 Crucial agency decisions often turn on such informa-
* B.A. 1974, J.D. 1979, Yale University. Assistant Professor of Law, Washing-
ton and Lee University School of Law.
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1. See Note, Broadcast License Revocation for Deception and Illegal Transfer, 15
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 425 (1947); Brown, Character and Candor Requirements for
FCC Licensees, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 644 (1957).
2. Even with deregulation in the 1980s, the FCC requires certain information
from those seeking licenses or otherwise appearing before it. Applicants for radio and
standard television licenses continue tb compete for construction permits on the basis
of established criteria, according to which they make representations to the FCC dur-
ing the licensee selection process. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hear-
ings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 5 R.R.2d 1901 (1965). For the continued vitality of these
criteria, see Deregulation of Commercial Television, - F.C.C.2d -, 56 R.R.2d 1005,
1021 (1984). Licensees operating in a "deregulated" environment must still maintain
lists of public issues and responsive programming as part of their enduring "bedrock
obligation" to serve the public interest. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 49
R.R.2d 1, clarified, 87 F.C.C.2d 797, 50 R.R.2d 93 (1981), affid in part sub nom.
Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 707 F.2d 1414 (D.C.
Cir. 1983); Deregulation of Commercial Television, supra at 1031. Groups seeking
minority status in low power television lotteries must represent minority ownership
interests. Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Allow the Selection from Among
Certain Competing Applications Using Random Selection on Lotteries Instead of
Comparative Hearings, 93 F.C.C.2d 952, 966, 53 R.R.2d 1401, 1414 (1983). Licen-
sees must provide information as to employees, positions held, and recruiting efforts in
Equal Employment Opportunity reports. 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080; see also Metroplex
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tion. When a person submits misstatements-deliberately, reck-
lessly, negligently, or innocently-the effect is to diminish the
agency's power to reach informed administrative decisions.'
And yet, while the FCC has often voiced this concern-that
the integrity of its work depends on the objective accuracy of
individual submissions 4 -the agency's central interest in this
area has been something quite different. That interest has been
the "character" of the individual, and whether the act of supply-
ing the misinformation amounted to a "misrepresentation." 5
Specifically, the question has been whether the individual
intended to deceive the agency.6 In the Commission's eyes, a
showing of intent to deceive signals a strong possibility that the
intentional deceiver cannot be relied upon to observe FCC rules
in the future; an instance (or several) of defective character be-
Communications of Florida, 96 F.C.C.2d 1090, 55 R.R.2d 886 (1984) (designation of
misrepresentation issue involving accuracy of EEO information). Licensees receiving
FCC inquiries as to station operations and conformance with FCC rules must respond
with the requested information. See, e.g., Triad Broadcasting, Inc., 96 F.C.C.2d 1235,
55 R.R.2d 919 (1984) (forfeiture imposed for material misinformation in response to
agency inquiry). This list is not exhaustive, but demonstrates the agency's ongoing
need for specific information in order to carry out its mandate. As long as the FCC
requires some information-some accountability--on the part of those it licenses, the
phenomenon of misinformation will no doubt endure.
3. Sissela Bok makes the same point about intentional deceivers in her book,
LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 19 (1978), where she writes:
"To the extent that knowledge gives power, to that extent do lies affect the distribu-
tion of power; they add to that of the liar, and diminish that of the deceived, altering
his choices at different levels."
4. See, e.g., RKO General, Inc. v. F.C.C., 670 F.2d 215, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
("The FCC has an affirmative obligation to license more than 10,000 radio and televi-
sion stations in the public interest, each required to apply for renewal. . . . As a
result the Commission must rely heavily on the completeness and accuracy of the
submissions made to it, and its applicants in turn have an affirmative duty to inform
the Commission of the facts it needs in order to fulfill its statutory mandate."); Sea
Island Broadcasting Corp., 60 F.C.C.2d 146, 37 R.R.2d 1235 (1976), recon. denied, 64
F.C.C.2d 721, 40 R.R.2d 1053 (1977), affd sub nom. Sea Island Broadcasting Corp. v.
F.C.C., 627 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Grenco, Inc., 39 F.C.C.2d 726, 732, 26 R.R.2d
1046, 1051 (1973). See also Sharp & Lively, Can the Broadcaster in the Black Hat
Ride Again? Good Character Requirement for Broadcast Licensees, 32 FED. COM. L.J.
173, 183 n.40 (hereafter, "Sharp & Lively, Good Character").
5. See, e.g., WOKO, Inc., 10 F.C.C. 454 (1944), rev'd sub nom. WOKO, Inc. v.
F.C.C., 153 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1946) rev'd, 329 U.S. 223 (1946); Fox River Broad-
casting, Inc., 93 F.C.C.2d 127, 53 R.R.2d 44 (1983).
6. Lewel Broadcasting Co., 86 F.C.C.2d 896, 911-12, 49 R.R.2d 871, 884 (1981)
("... the failure to disqualify the applicant in a particular case turns on a conclusion
that the evidence does not support a finding of deliberate misrepresentation").
MISREPRESENTATION
comes the basis for a prediction as to future performance.7 In a
number of celebrated cases, the FCC has responded to a showing
of intentional deception, or reckless disregard of the truth, by
totally disqualifying the individual from the airwaves.8 Since
1946 the individual's "willingness to deceive"-rather than any
other factor-has emerged as the essence of a misrepresentation
case.
9
In the ensuing years, the FCC has exhibited symptoms of
an agency at war with itself in the area of misrepresentation.
Since a finding of intent to deceive is linked to the sanction of
disqualification, the FCC has shown an often paralyzing reluc-
tance to find the requisite intent in any but the most flagrant,
inescapable cases. Whether out of ambivalence about its mind-
reading prowess, or a simple disinclination to disqualify a mem-
ber of the industry from the licensing process, the agency strains
to avoid a finding of intent to deceive. This hesitance has gone
largely unnoticed-perhaps because attention has focused on
those notorious cases where the evidence of intent to deceive was
overwhelming, and the FCC indeed moved to disqualify.10 But
in situations involving any ambiguity, the FCC shrinks away
from drawing inferences, and, employing any of several modes
of analysis, makes little of the alleged lies.11
7. Iai at 912, 49 R.1.2d at 884 ("The critical question is whether we can rely on
representations made by this licensee."). The FCC has recently shown dissatisfaction
with inconsistencies in its cases involving character and has questioned whether there
is indeed any "nexus between character and future license performance." Policy Re-
garding Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, 87 F.C.C.2d 836, 841 (1981).
See also Sharp & Lively, Good Character, supra note 4 (questioning FCC character
policies and proposing a standard of competence).
8. See, e-g., WOKO, Inc., supra note 5; WMOZ, Inc., 36 F.C.C. 201 (1964);
Nick J. Chaconas, 28 F.C.C.2d 231, 21 R.R.2d 576 (1971), recon. denied, 35 F.C.C.2d
698, 24 R.R.2d 811 (1972), affid sub nom. Chaconas v. F.C.C., 486 F.2d 1314 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Western Communications, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1441, 37 R.R.2d 999 (1976),
affid Las Vegas Valley Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 589 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. denied 441 U.S. 931 (1979).
9. F.C.C. v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 226-227 (1946).
10. See Abel, Clift and Weiss, Station License Revocations and Denials of Renew-
als, 1934-1969, 14 J. BROADCASTING 411 (1970); Weiss, Ostroff and Clift, Station
License Revocations and Denials of Renewal, 1970-78, 24 J. BROADCASTING 69 (1980);
Tallin, The RKO Case: Unique Facts with Extraordinary Circumstances, 35 FED.
COM. L.J. 275 (1983); Note, The Struggle to Define Character in FCC License Renewal
Decisions: RKO General, Inc, 22 B.C.L. Rnv. 409 (1981).
11. Twenty years ago, Professor Jaffe noted that "much of [the FCC's] policy is
vague and ineffectual. It has thundered and threatened much more than it has regu-
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As discussed herein, the FCC's various ways of avoiding a
finding of intent to deceive are certainly not new. But the cur-
rent FCC is following these traditions without question or pause.
Moreover, today's FCC has recently increased the burden which
a party must shoulder in requesting that the Commission desig-
nate a misrepresentation for hearing. 12 Although the FCC de-
fends that heightened burden as necessary to deter frivolous
charges, the standard seems destined to block meritorious claims
as well.
This possibility is particularly troubling in an era of unprec-
edented deregulation. As the FCC's Review Board has pointed
out, the agency "more so now than ever" must depend on the
"absolute candor of the applicants. . . because our license ap-
plication forms rely increasingly on bare representations and less
on documentation." 13 The FCC Chairman himself, advocating a
"marketplace approach" to regulation, has stated that even in
the "unregulated" environment which he envisions, "[flying or
other malfeasance toward the Commission. . .would be among
the few bases on which the Commission would be likely to strip
a licensee of its exclusivity." 14 Despite these acknowledgements
of the importance of accurate information, especially in the
streamlined 1980s, the Commission remains wedded to a highly
pliable standard-the intent test-which may do little to dis-
courage deceivers, and to precedents which appear to condone
some dishonesty.
lated." Jaffe, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 48 (1965). See also
Sharp & Lively, Good Character, supra note 4, at 200: "Where a penalty is absolute,
there is often a tendency for the deciding body to overlook minor infractions which
seem unworthy of the ultimate penalty. This course of action undermines the agency's
credibility. It tells regulatees that the FCC talks a tough line on misrepresentation,
but does not back it up with action. It also encourages broadcasters who successfully
engage in minor deceptions to continue that practice with impunity." While Sharp &
Lively note the problem, they acknowledge only that "minor deceptions" may go un-
heeded-a premise challenged by this Article. Moreover, they seem to have no
trouble with the intent standard as a way of dealing with misinformation, id., at 183-
84, n.40, whereas this Article identifies that standard as the heart of a number of
problems.
12. Riverside Broadcasting Co., Inc., - F.C.C.2d -, 53 R.R.2d 1154 (1983),
af'd, - F.C.C.2d -, 56 R.R.2d 618 (1984).
13. Superior Broadcasting of California, 94 F.C.C.2d 904, 909, 54 R.R.2d 773,
776-77 (1983).
14. Fowler and Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60
TEx. L. REv. 207, 247 (1982).
MISREPRESENTATION
This Article will explore the offense of misrepresentation
before the FCC from the standpoint of its dubious cornerstone-
intent to deceive. It will trace the emergence of that element and
its probable ineffectiveness to further the agency's stated poli-
cies. The Article will then discuss the intent test in practice,
suggesting that in cases where the FCC has disqualified parties
for lying, the test has been superfluous, and in cases where the
FCC has cleared parties of lying, the test has dissolved with
some frequency into confusion and contradiction in long, expen-
sive administrative hearings and appeals. The Article will then
note recent agency action which seems to solidify the traditional
approach and to make allegations of misrepresentation all the
more difficult to prove. It concludes that the FCC is an agency
moving in two different directions: on the one hand, stating a
strong policy requiring accuracy and threatening a potent sanc-
tion for offenders; on the other hand, developing a definition of
liability which allows maximum discretion for appraising indi-
vidual cases, so that the decision-makers may avoid imposing
the sanction. As a result, if the intent test is retained in this era
of deregulation, industry may soon decide that telling certain lies
to the FCC is, "more so now than ever," an acceptable risk to
take.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF INTENT: EARLY THEMES
From the birth of the Commission in 1934 to 1939, the
FCC was relatively tolerant of licensee misconduct, and renewed
licenses even after finding considerable rule violations. 15 With
the broadcast industry in its infancy, the agency "seems to have
regarded a poor station as better than no station at all," and was
"reluctant to deprive a community of its only radio broadcast
station." 16 By 1940, the Commission evinced a tougher policy
on rule violations;1 7 the central question was the choice of penal-
ties. Accordingly, in the earliest misrepresentation decisions,
the FCC's central concern was the selection of appropriate sanc-
tions for the particular misstatements at hand-not to delineate
the offense and all its elements. Still, these early cases show the
Commission's concept of misrepresentation taking form, with al-
15. Note, supra note 1, 15 GEO. WASH. L. REv. at 442.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 443.
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lusions to the role of intent and to the policies underlying the
regulatory interest in accurate information.
The 1940 case of WSAL 18 involved the FCC's power under
the Communications Act to revoke a license. Section 312(a) of
the Communications Act, as then written, authorized the Com-
mission to revoke "for false statements" made in applications or
other statements of fact required by the agency. 19 Finding that
existing station WSAL had misstated its capital by some 85% in
its application two years before, the FCC stripped WSAL of its
license for "false and fraudulent statements and
representations."
20
The case was an important assertion of the FCC's power to
revoke. A secondary-and tantalizing-aspect of the opinion is
its fitful discussion of "fraudulence." While the FCC, in calling
the statements "fraudulent," indicated a belief that WSAL's
statements had been intentionally false, the opinion nowhere
stated that "intent to decieve" was necessary for revocation.
Moreover, in an order appended to the WSAL opinion, the FCC
"modified" its findings of fact to note that the licensee had been
"entirely unfamiliar with the procedure and requirements of the
Commission," and that he "lacked full knowledge of the true
impact of the information supplied the Commission. ' 21 None-
theless, the FCC affirmed the revocation-in effect, deciding that
the licensee deserved to lose his license, regardless of mental
18. WSAL, 8 F.C.C. 34 (1940). For a brief discussion of WSAL, Mayflower
Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940), and Navarro Broadcasting Association, 8
F.C.C. 198 (1940), not in terms of my subject-the intent standard-but in terms of
the FCC's balancing of considerations in assessing character, see Sharp & Lively,
Good Character, 32 FED. COM. L.J. at 181-83.
19. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(1). As it originally appeared in the Communications Act
of 1934, Section 312 granted "to the Commission the authority to revoke station
licenses on certain grounds specified therein, without regard to whether the prohibited
acts are willfully, knowingly, or repeatedly committed." H.R. REP. No. 1750, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2234, 2246. Revo-
cation was thus allowable for "violations ranging from the most serious to the least
minor and affecting those who may innocently violate regulations of the Commission
on technical matters." S. REP. No. 44, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in P & F
RADIO REGS. Current Service 10:282. Section 312 was amended in 1982 to provide
for license revocation for misstatements only when knowingly made. Congress' con-
cern was to retain revocation for serious offenses, including willful misstatements, and
to provide for lesser sanctions for "minor or less serious violations." Id.
20. 8 F.C.C. at 34, 37.
21. Id. at 38.
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state. For a brief moment, at least, the Commission appeared
willing to disqualify a broadcaster despite lack of clear intent to
deceive, and without a definite conclusion as to the broadcaster's
future reliability to observe FCC rules.
A second 1940 case, Mayflower Broadcasting Corporation,22
involved not a revocation proceeding under Section 312(a), but a
charge of lying raised during the licensing process. The appli-
cant claimed that its stock was issued and outstanding and that
it had a certain amount of cash; in fact, the stock had not been
issued and the applicant held only demand notes.23 The FCC
apparently believed that Mayflower's deception was intentional,
but, again, the opinion does not make intent a necessary ele-
ment. The case is important for the two policy grounds identi-
fied by the FCC as justifying Mayflower's disqualification:
(1) its conduct impeded "the progress of the Commission in car-
rying out its mandate"; and (2) it could not be "entrusted with
the burdens imposed by a broadcast license." 24 These policies
underlie misrepresentation cases even today: the agency's inter-
est in fully-informed decision-making and smooth functioning of
the administrative process; and the interest in granting licenses
only to those of reliable character.25
A third key case from 1940 is Navarro Broadcasting Associ-
ation,26 where the FCC unaccountably shrank from the strict
penalty of WSAL and Mayflower. In a revocation hearing in-
volving intentional misrepresentations, the FCC accepted the ar-
gument it had rejected in WSAL-that the licensee was now
"ready to act in good faith," and could be "trusted with the pub-
lic responsibilities" of a broadcast license.27 This decision is
"impossible to reconcile" with the others,2" and the Commission
did not even try.
Thus, although clear-cut statements on the effects of mis-
representation or the role of intent had yet to emerge, the FCC's
willingness to disqualify at least some of the time was clear, forc-
ing defense lawyers to stop arguing against the legitimacy of dis-
22. 8 F.C.C. at 333.
23. Id. at 335.
24. Id. at 338.
25. See RKO General v. F.C.C., supra note 4.
26. 8 F.C.C. 198 (1940).
27. Id. at 199, 200.
28. See Note, supra note 1, at 443.
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qualification as a sanction per se. They had to find a new
strategy to save their clients' licenses in misrepresentation cases,
and they may have sensed that the FCC would grow dissatisfied
with the vagueness and minimal deterrent value of the "ready-
to-act-in-good-faith" formula of Navarro. The new strategy
quickly emerged: first, to argue that a necessary element of mis-
representation was intent to deceive; and, second, to say that the
applicant or licensee at hand had no such intent.
In the 1942 case of Panama City Broadcasting Co.,29 that
argument was almost unbelievably successful. There, an entre-
preneur-lawyer of varied business interests, John H. Perry, al-
lowed a front group to apply for a station without revealing to
the FCC that Perry was the real party in interest. Perry was not
a local resident of the proposed community of license and had
connections with the local newspaper. His lawyer considered
these factors to be drawbacks to his broadcast application, ad-
vised Perry to conceal his involvement in the application until
the FCC granted the license, and Perry agreed.
When the FCC learned of the scheme after granting the li-
cense, it began revocation proceedings, ultimately finding that it
had been "grossly misled" and calling the deception "deliberate
and not innocent."30 But the FCC faulted Perry's agents, not
Perry; to the FCC, Perry's flaw was simply his "bad judgment"
in selecting associates.31 Unlike the intentional deceivers in
Navarro, Perry demonstrated no "personal fault" in the eyes of
the FCC.32 And although the FCC had disqualified WSAL's
hapless principal in a similar set of circumstances, the FCC
spared Perry as a man who had "intended to make the applica-
tion in his own name," but who had been misadvised to conceal
his interest.33 Respondeat superior was but a "technical rule of
law" having no place in FCC licensing.34 Perry's success was
thus in convincing the agency that intent to deceive was the key
element of the offense, that the knowledge and intentions of his
29. 9 F.C.C. 208 (1942).
30. Id. at 215.
31. Id. at 216.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 216-17.
34. Id at 216.
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agents were not imputable to him, and that his own state of
mind fell considerably short of the requisite intent.
Still, there were voices on the Commission favoring the
strict approach found in WSAL-that presence or absence of in-
tent to deceive should not be determinative. Three of the seven
Commissioners dissented in Panama City, urging that even if
Perry's omissions were due to "bad judgment," he should be dis-
qualified.35 Negligence in selecting agents and supplying misin-
formation should be enough; otherwise, to allow Perry to keep
his license "would be to reward him for his own bad judg-
ment."'36 At stake was the FCC's fundamental interest in ob-
taining accurate information from those it regulates, regardless
of the party's state of mind: "The issues involved in this pro-
cegding directly affect the integrity of the proceedings before the
Commission, and, indeed, of the administrative process.
'37
Panama City is a central case for a number of reasons.
First, it effectively established intent to deceive as the corner-
stone of misrepresentation. Ironically, the intent test explicitly
emerged in a case where it became the basis for clearing an indi-
vidual of the charge. Second, the opinions in Panama City made
different uses of the policies underlying the FCC's approach to
misrepresentation. The majority, in clearing Perry, found no
"personal fault," thus emphasizing only the "character" policy
of Mayflower.38 The dissent, however, addressed both Mayflower
policies: that the misstatements, regardless of intent, snarled
and abused the administrative process, and that even "bad judg-
ment" related to character. 9
A final observation is that the FCC had three options in
Panama City: it could have (a) disqualified Perry altogether, an
approach consistent with WSAL; (b) acknowledged that Perry
lied and absolved him-an approach which would have diluted
the impact of WSAL and Mayflower; or (c) distanced Perry from
the misinformation by characterizing his participation as merely
negligent. The Commission's choice of the third option makes
for a particularly unpersuasive opinion. The Commission appar-
35. Id. at 219-22.
36. Id. at 220.
37. Id. at 222.
38. 8 F.C.C. at 338.
39. 9 F.C.C. at 220-22.
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ently sought to have it both ways: to spare the particular liar
and yet continue to voice a strong deterrent policy against lying.
The perfect vehicle for those conflicting goals was the intent test;
with it, the FCC could continue to condemn lying in general,
while at the same time reserve flexibility to characterize Perry's
mental state as something other than intentional and thus the
misstatement at hand as something other than a lie.
A fifth case in the 1940s introduced other key elements in
the agency's developing approach to misrepresentation. In
WOKO, Inc.,' the FCC denied a renewal application on the
ground that the licensee had filed annual reports for twelve years
concealing the identity of the beneficial owner of a 24% interest
in the licensee's stock. Claiming that it had not intended to
deceive the agency, the licensee said it lacked "definite informa-
tion concerning the identity" of the 24% owner who was listed
in the corporate records under another name.41 The FCC
brushed aside the argument. First, there was motive: the 24%
owner was a CBS network official who sought to conceal his in-
terest because WOKO was seeking network affiliation through
his office and disclosure would be "embarrassing" to him profes-
sionally.42 Second, there was documentation: stock certificates
and a series of incriminating letters established a long course of
deception.43 The FCC had no trouble denying renewal on the
basis of clear-cut intent to deceive.
In the Court of Appeals,44 WOKO argued that the misin-
formation was immaterial; that the agency had not relied on the
misinformation in granting previous renewals; and that the sanc-
tion was a "radical" departure from cases like Navarro where the
FCC had balanced the licensee's past record with the instance of
misrepresentation. In WOKO, the FCC had refused to conduct
such a balancing test. Convinced on all three points, the Court
of Appeals overturned the nonrenewal as arbitrary and capri-
cious agency action.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals:
It is said that in this case the Commission failed to find that the
40. Supra note 5.
41. 10 F.C.C. at 464.
42. Id. at 461.
43. Id. at 465-66.
44. WOKO, Inc. v. F.C.C., 153 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
MISREPRESENTATION
concealment was of material facts or had influenced the Commis-
sion in making any decision, or that it would have acted differently
had it known that the [24% owners] were beneficial owners of the
stock. We think this is beside the point. The fact of concealment
may be more significant than the facts concealed. The willingness to
deceive a regulatory body may be disclosed by immaterial and useless
deceptions as well as by material and persuasive ones.45
Here, the Court contributed mightily to a definition of misrepre-
sentation before the FCC. After WOKO, the misinformation
need not be material; the agency need not have relied on the
information; indeed, the deceiving party's primary purpose need
not be to deceive the FCC, for the licensee in WOKO sought
chiefly to delude CBS through nondisclosure in public docu-
ments. WOKO's misrepresentation had thus been a function of
two elements: the submission of erroneous information, coupled
with a "willingness to deceive." On the basis of these elements,
the Court upheld the FCC's discretion to remove a license de-
spite a positive past record. WOKO thus came to stand for the
legality of the harshest of measures for any intended deception.
Yet there was an additional comment in the Supreme
Court's WOKO opinion that has been fairly ignored: "A denial
of an application for a license because of the insufficiency or de-
liberate falsity of the ipformation lawfully required to be fur-
nished is not a penal measure. '4 6 What is this "insufficiency"
which the Court mentions in the disjunctive with "deliberate fal-
sity"? One commentator reads this as "the knowing submission
of insufficient information,"'47 but that reading requires the inser-
tion of scienter, an element which the Court itself left out. The
Court instead may be suggesting that insufficiency-knowing or
unknowing-could be a legitimate concern of the FCC and
could warrant nonrenewal. Under this view, intent to deceive
may not always be necessary. And yet since WOKO involved a
clear case of intentional deception, the Court dwelt no further on
the tantalizing idea of "insufficiency" as possibly justifying non-
renewal along with "deliberate falsity."
Thus, the key element in the developing definition of mis-
representation was intent to deceive. And in the late 1940's,
45. F.C.C. v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 226-27 (1946) (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 228.
47. Byrne, RKO General: Some Lessons To Be Learned, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 145,
148 (1983).
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communications lawyers were brilliantly successful in arguing
that their clients' significant misstatements or omissions were
not intentional. An applicant's claim of local residence, while
"inaccurate and on a material point" was excused as "an error in
judgment rather than of intent to deceive."'48 Failure to disclose
a 49% interest in another station, while clearly a material omis-
sion, was deemed a "misunderstanding. ' 49 The FCC also ex-
cused misstatements where the presence of intent to deceive was
a "close question," but the evidence was ultimately
"inconclusive.
50
The FCC may well have been correct in these individual
cases in declining to find intent to deceive; the correctness of the
factual findings is not worth debating now. The question is
whether the intent test itself made sense even as it emerged in
the early history of the FCC. As noted, the Mayflower case iden-
tified two policies underlying the insistence on accuracy: first,
the FCC's need as a regulatory agency to be fully informed as it
carries out its statutory mandate; and second, the public interest
in licensing individuals of desirable "character" to a scarce pub-
lic resource. Does the intent test "fit" these policies? Arguably
not. The first policy is simply a demand for accurate informa-
tion. The intent test promotes this policy only insofar as it al-
lows the FCC to make a rough estimate as to whether an
individual will misinform the agency in the future, on the theory
that one who intends to misinform today is likely to do the same
tomorrow, and thus is likely to impede the administrative pro-
cess and to promote inferior decision-making. But all this could
also be said of one who does not intend to misinform but who
nevertheless negligently misinforms the FCC. If he is negligent
once, he may be negligent again, with the same result: impeded
processes and inferior decisions. The intent test thus winnows
48. Air Waves, Inc., 11 F.C.C. 184, 190 (1946). There the principal of a compet-
ig applicant identified his domicile and home address as Baton Rouge, the proposed
community of license. In reality, he had lived in New Orleans for ten years; by
identifying a relative's address in Baton Rouge as his domicile, he would obtain com-
parative credit for local residence. After acknowledging the "necessity of determining
[the] intent" behind such misinformation, the FCC ruled in the principal's favor. The
FCC did not elaborate on how it reached this decision, except to say that "on consid-
eration of all the factors involved, we are inclined to [this] view ... " Id. at 190.
49. Charleston Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 438, 442 (1947).
50. The Northern Corporation, 15 F.C.C. 60, 82-83 (1950).
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out too few to be an adequate vehicle for furthering the first
policy.
As for the second-the "character" interest-it may well be
legitimate to probe the mental state of a licensee to ensure that
only worthy public servants are occupying the airwaves. And
yet the question could be asked: how is a merely negligent sup-
plier of misinformation better suited for an FCC license than one
who intends to deceive? The "character" of both is arguably
deficient, especially if the misinformation is material.
Thus, the test fashioned in the 1940s may have been insuffi-
cient from the start to serve its underlying policies. A stricter
test would have been more consistent-a test along the lines of
the WSAL case or the dictum on "insufficiency" in WOKO. Be-
cause of its need for accurate information, the Commission
might have penalized those submitting material misinformation
either through disqualification or a steep, preordained monetary
forfeiture. State of mind should not have been a factor because
of its tenuous connection to the underlying policies. An objec-
tive requirement that all assertions made to the FCC be accurate
would have promoted more accurate information and greater re-
sponsibility on the part of those appearing before the
Commission.
But in focusing on intent, the FCC clearly chose another
path. Perhaps the FCC was harkening back to common law
fraud with its element of willful deception." Or perhaps the
agency's sense was that mental state was a worthwhile frame-
work, especially in the early years when government regulations
and procedures were still new and unfamiliar to industry. Or
perhaps the FCC felt that "character" under Section 308 of the
Act involved a measure of purposefulness rather than of negli-
gence or "bad judgment." Whatever the impulse, the test as de-
veloped in the 1940s survives intact today.
II. THE INTENT STANDARD IN PRACTICE
a. The "Easy" Cases
Since the 1940s, the intent standard has survived almost un-
questioned. The lack of criticism-whether from within the
51. See generally Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 583 (1958).
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agency, from the communications bar, or from citizen groups-
is surely one reason for its long life. As noted, an inquiry based
on mental state gives the agency flexibility. It affords defense
lawyers room to argue the circumstances of each case so that
there are virtually no "precedents" which can command a cer-
tain result. Citizen groups alleging misrepresentation plainly do
not benefit from the standard, but seem not to have specified the
standard itself as a problem--only the agency's reluctance in
ambiguous cases to draw inferences and to make a finding of
intentional deception. 2
The test's longevity may also stem from the fact that, in a
number of celebrated cases where the circumstantial evidence of
intent to deceive was overwhelming, the Commission moved de-
cisively to disqualify on that basis, and the outcome seemed fair.
Cases such as WMOZ, Inc. ,53 Nick J. Chaconas,54 Western Com-
munications, Inc., and RKO General, Inc.,56 gave legitimacy to
the intent test because, in each, culpable intent was dramatically
apparent and the FCC's question-whether the broadcaster in-
tended to deceive-seemed an acceptable one for the agency to
be asking.
In the notorious case of WMOZ, Inc., the FCC sought to
discover whether a licensee had filed accurate program logs with
its renewal application. The evidence was inescapable that the
station's principal had, in fact, forged the logs to reflect inflated
amounts of public affairs and news programming.5 7 The FCC
was able to compare one of the forged logs with the original in
the station's files; the FCC also learned that the applicant's prin-
cipal had supervised the preparation of the new logs, even to the
point of using forged signatures and initials of a deceased an-
52. See, eg., Riverside Broadcasting Co., Inc., - F.C.C.2d -, 53 R.R.2d 1154
(1983), affid, - F.C.C.2d -, 56 R.R.2d 618 (1984).
53. 36 F.C.C. 201, 1 R.R.2d 801 (1964).
54. 28 F.C.C.2d 231, 21 R.R.2d 576 (1971), recon. denied, 35 F.C.C.2d 699, 24
R.R.2d 811 (1972), affid sub nom Chaconas v. F.C.C., 486 F.2d 1314 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
55. 59 F.C.C.2d 1441, 37 R.R.2d 999 (1976), affld sub nom. Las Vegas Valley
Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 589 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 441 U.S. 931
(1979).
56. 78 F.C.C.2d 1, 47 R.R.2d 921 (1980), ajffd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom.
RKO General, Inc. v. F.C.C., 670 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
927 (1982).
57. Supra note 53 at 212-13, 1 R.R.2d at 820-21.
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nouncer 5 8 This evidence was part of "a record of attempted
fraud and deception virtually without equal in Commission his-
tory," and was easily sufficient to discredit the principal's convo-
luted defense (that he had been framed by a young assistant and
a rebellious staff). 9 The FCC had no trouble concluding that
the applicant lacked "the requisite character qualifications to be
a licensee of this agency. ' 60
Similarly, in Nick J. Chaconas, the licensee had falsified op-
erating logs. The FCC's task of identifying culpable intent was
none too difficult; the agency had on hand both an FCC investi-
gator's photocopy of the original logs as well as the licensee's
own logs as subsequently altered. From this evidence, the FCC
concluded that Chaconas had lied to the agency "to escape em-
barrassing inquiry, '61 and that, like the WMOZ principal, he
lacked "the basic character qualifications to remain a licensee."62
Western Communications, Inc. involved a network affiliate
engaged in clipping-the deletion of portions of the network
feed without reporting such deletions to the network. In effect,
Western was overscheduling local commercials and thus inter-
rupting network programs and commercials. When the FCC
sent four inquiries to the licensee based on viewer complaints,
Western denied its practices each time in letters sent to the Com-
missionA4 The FCC stripped Western of its license. The Com-
mission stated that Western's clipping and repeated denials each
constituted independent grounds for disqualification.6 -
The circumstantial evidence in the case showed conclu-
sively that the four letters were intended to deceive the FCC.
The FCC merely compared Western's assertions with the net-
work's own records on the length of time legitimately available
for local commercials. These discrepancies evinced a station
policy of "protracted and flagrant" clipping;66 the four letters
were thus seen as "clearly designed to conceal" Western's opera-
58. 36 F.C.C. at 239, 1 R.R.2d at 851.
59. Id. at 238, 220, 1 R.R.2d at 849, 830.
60. Id. at 239, 1 R.R.2d at 851.
61. Supra note 54, 28 F.C.C.2d at 234-35, 21 R.R.2d at 579.
62. Id.
63. Supra note 55, 59 F.C.C.2d at 1442, 37 R.R.2d at 1002.
64. Id. at 1446-49, 37 R.R.2d at 1006-09.
65. Id. at 1445, 1447, 37 R.R.2d at 1005, 1007.
66. Id. at 1445, 37 R.R.2d at 1005.
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tions and policies.67 Of particular interest in the case was the
FCC's statement that even one of the four Western letters,
"standing alone, would be sufficient grounds for the denial of
Western's renewal application."68 Thus, in accord with the dis-
cussion in WOKO years before, the FCC stressed that a single
instance of "willingness to deceive" could trigger the maximum
penalty.
A fourth example is RKO General, Inc., where the FCC, in
a highly controversial 4-3 decision, ruled inter alia that RKO
lacked candor during renewal proceedings. 69 This conduct con-
stituted an independent justification for the agency's sanction:
nonrenewal of RKO's three multi-million dollar VHF television
licenses. RKO had withheld material information concerning
an SEC probe of the licensee's parent company. Moreover,
when a competing applicant argued before the agency that RKO
had violated its duty to disclose the SEC inquiry, RKO affirma-
tively denied the validity of the competing applicant's charges.
The FCC-and later the Court of Appeals7 -found that in all
this, RKO lacked candor: the court called this conclusion "un-
contraverted and uncontestable" based as it was on a compari-
son between "what RKO said in its earlier pleadings-and what
it did not say-with RKO's subsequent admissions ... .
With WOKO, these are four of the most oft-cited cases for
the proposition that willful deception of the FCC is forbidden
and that disqualification is the sanction. But these are relatively
"easy" cases. They involve misstatements in documents which
the agency could compare with other, directly related docu-
ments in order to reach a decision. And the misstatements were
material: they concealed station practices to obtain license re-
newal or to prevent agency sanctions. In each, the circumstan-
tial evidence of intentional deception was unavoidable. And so,
the agency did not appear at all unreasonable in taking action on
the basis of mental state.
Indeed, the "intent to deceive" standard in these cases was
hardly necessary. The Commission could have assessed each
67. Id. at 1449, 37 R.R.2d at 1009.
68. Id. at 1447, 37 R.R.2d at 1007.
69. Supra note 55, 78 F.C.C.2d at 92-104, 47 R.R.2d at 994-1003.
70. 670 F.2d at 228-36.
71. Id. at 234.
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case not in the framework of intent, but in terms of the regula-
tor's need for accurate information. Regardless of the mental
state of the principals of WMOZ, Western Communications,
RKO, or Nick Chaconas, the FCC could have ruled to disqual-
ify on the basis of the materiality of the misinformation it had
received. The act of submitting such patently erroneous docu-
ments could have been viewed as an unacceptable interference
with the administrative process. If such misstatements had gone
undetected, the FCC likely would have made one decision, (i.e.,
grant of a renewal application) rather than another (grant of the
spectrum space to someone else). The framework of intent in
such cases was therefore not required.
b. The "Harder" Cases
For a large number of other cases, the FCC did not have
the conclusive circumstantial evidence of intent seen in WMOZ,
Nick J. Chaconas, Western, and RKO. Thus, it was not possible
merely to compare one set of logs, records or pleadings with an-
other, and draw the none-too-difficult inference of culpable
mental state from significant discrepancies or alterations. The
"harder" cases involve some-although not always a great deal
of-ambiguity. It is here that the FCC would be expected to
develop a thoughtful approach to intent-to work out factors to
be considered in each case, or to suggest inferences to be drawn
in situations lacking conclusive documentary evidence. 2 But
72. The FCC might have looked to the tort of misrepresentation and the common
law cases involving deception in commercial relations. In the English case of Derry v.
Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889), the House of Lords ruled that a plaintiff who
purchased stock in reliance on a false prospectus had the task of establishing intent to
deceive on the part of the defendant directors. Lord Herschell stated a test similar to
the standard the FCC would one day adopt, that intent to deceive is established
"when it is shown that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly; or
(2) without belief in its truth; or (3) recklessly, careless of whether it be true or false."
14 App. Cas. 337, 374 (1889). Thus, a defendant would escape liability on a showing
tha he entertained an "honest belief" in the truth of his misstatements.
As Professor Leon Green has written, Lord Herschell's was a "forbidding
formula," placing a heavy burden on the plaintiff and according relief to a defendant
on the basis of belief. Green, The Communicative Torts, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1, 29 (1975).
In Green's estimate, the formula "did not discourage the deceiver. In fact, his decep-
tions became more difficult to prove, and their penalties more readily avoided." Id. at
27. Courts then began to enlarge the concept of deceptive intent to include situations
where the speaker, although honestly believing his statements, "consciously realized
that the information upon which he was relying was insufficient to be convincing."
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the FCC's decisions drift on a sea of subjectivity; ambiguity be-
comes exculpatory. In many of these "harder cases," the Com-
mission adopts one of at least four modes of analysis. Useful
labels for these modes are: (a) psychoanalytic; (b) literalist;
(c) "administrative feel"; and (d) "human frailty." Each enables
the decision-maker to avoid the imposition of the ultimate sanc-
tion. The argument here presented is not that the FCC wrong-
fully cleared the particular individuals in these cases, but simply
that the "[agency] has allowed its concern over a remedy to in-
fect its analysis of liability."
73
Keeton, supra note 51 at 589. In the language of one court "[A] party who is aware
that he has only an opinion and represents that opinion as knowledge, does not believe
his representation to be true." Cabot v. Christie, 42 Vt. 121, 126 (1869), cited in
Keeton, supra, at 591.
A next step taken by some courts was to infer intentional deception when a
speaker misstated facts that were susceptible of knowledge but which the speaker care-
lessly omitted to discover: ". . . if a person makes a statement that a thing that is
susceptible of knowledge is true, it is implied that he knows it to be true of his own
knowledge, and if he has no such knowledge, he is guilty of actual fraud." National
Bank v. Hamilton, 202 Ill. App. 516, 521 (1916), cited in Green, supra, at 28 n.87.
Here the borderline between intentional deception and negligent misrepresentation ob-
viously blurred, wfth courts "either declaring outright that the fault is equally great
and the reliance of the plaintiff equally justified, or adopting the rather obvious fiction
that duty to learn the facts or not to speak without knowing them is the full equivalent
of knowledge." PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 705 (1971).
Courts also had at their disposal the notion of "innocent misrepresentation." For
example, on a showing of mutual mistake between parties to a contract, courts could
decree rescission of the transaction and restoration of the status quo. Id. at 710. The
elimination of the intent standard, according to Professor Green, "made the equitable
remedy of rescission more acceptable to the cheater, but it also saved the victim the
expense and difficulties of making proof" of intent to deceive. Green, supra, at 28.
Professor Green compared these developments to the "erosions of all formulas
when subjected to litigation in many courts over many years." Id. at 29. As he wrote:
"This is not the first time that a rule of law too arbitrary and difficult to administer
has been flattened out by a stout fiction until it could be replaced by rules of substan-
tive flexibility more responsive to the duty imposed over a wide range of tortious
transactions." Id. And in the view of Professor Keeton, the common law saw benefits
in departing from the Derry v. Peek formulation, "since it would be monstrous to
require direct proof or something in the nature of an admission of bad faith." Keeton,
supra, at 584.
The FCC has moved differently. It did not take an ever-expanding view of intent
to deceive; having established disqualification as to sanction, the Commission was
loath to employ that sanction regularly. Requiring "direct proof" of intent to deceive
was not considered "monstrous" when so much was at stake.
73. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct. 774, 818 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984). The author of this
Article participated in representing the broadcaster before the Review Board in Gross
Telecasting, Inc, discussed infra. As stated, I am not commenting on the merits of
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1. The "Psychoanalytic" Mode
A leading case in the "psychoanalytic" mode is the 1970
decision in Grenco, Inc.7 The question was whether Cook,
whose station's renewal application was pending, had lied in a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"); the direct
testimony of three other witnesses at the hearing had contra-
dicted Cook's testimony.7- The ALJ ruled that Cook had indeed
lied, and denied his renewal. The FCC reversed, without dis-
cussing any of the particulars of Cook's testimony, without re-
ferring to demeanor findings, without considering possible
motive, and without mentioning the deference, if any, that
should be accorded the ALJ's unqualified conclusions. Instead,
the FCC stressed "the drastic consequences of an adverse ruling
(L e., disqualification)" and "the difficulty of remembering fully
conversations that occurred three to five years before the testi-
mony."' 76 The FCC rejected the view of Cook's testimony as
"deliberate lying (perjury)," but characterized it as:
[A] faulty shading of recollection-an attempt to recall long past
conversations where the consequences may have unconsciously in-
fluenced Cook's reflection in a manner favorable to himself. ,
. ..We think that this effort-perhaps understandable human na-
ture in the circumstances and reflecting adversely on Cook--cannot
be said to be deliberate falsehood (or perjury), with the degree of
certainty that we believe is reasonably called for with respect to a
finding of this nature. We stress that our holding is based on the
particular facts of this case, and does not represent in any way a
retreat from the important policy of WOKO that we cannot tempo-
rize with deliberate deception of the Commission. No matter how
unblemished the reputation of the principal in the community no
one is allowed "one bite" at the apple of deceit. We believe that by
this time the message has been received by broadcast licensees that a
station can get into greater and indeed the most difficulty by a
course of deception or lack of candor when an issue is raised.77
This key passage in the history of misrepresentation before the
FCC provided new flexibility in treating such cases. The FCC
first identified a mental state short of intent to deceive: "faulty
that or any other case, but only on the Commission's questionable modes of analyzing
the issue of misrepresentation.
74. 39 F.C.C.2d 732, 26 R.R.2d 1046 (1973).
75. Id at 769-70 (Initial Decision).
76. Id. at 737, 26 R.R.2d at 1052.
77. Id.
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shading of recollection." While the words "faulty shading" im-
plied an element of willfullness, the FCC quickly attributed such
willfulness to Cook's "unconscious": Cook's recollection was
"unconsciously influential . . . in a manner favorable to him-
self." According to the FCC this capacity for self-deception was
"understandable human nature" and did not amount to "delib-
erate falsehood."
In a sense, the agency's analysis in Grenco was nicely so-
phisticated. It acknowledged a complexity at the core of such
human activity, the mind's paradoxical ability to "shade" the
truth without awareness of its deliberate evasion. The Commis-
sion's portrayal of Cook is thus consistent with a standard psy-
choanalytic approach to the problem of self-deception, where the
"self-deceiver" is seen as:
[O]ne who doesn't perceive his own fakery, who can't see through
the smokescreen he himself puts up. We also say that in a way he
sincerely believes the story he tells while "deep inside him" he
knows it is not true. He makes it appear to himself that something is
so. We say the self-deceiver is unaware of his own deception; and,
in straight psychoanalytic language, we speak of his unconscious
wishes and fantasies.7 s
The psychoanalyst's terminology is thus "morally neutral"-the
notion that the self-deceiver "does not have control over what
one is doing."
79
In adopting such an approach, the FCC was able to avoid a
finding of intent to deceive. But in opening the door on the sub-
ject of self-deception, the FCC betrayed no awareness that self-
deception can be assessed in other ways as well-and in ways
that relate to the agency's concern for "character." Besides the
nonjudgmental, psychoanalytic view, there is the position es-
poused by some philosophers that the self-deceiver is blamewor-
thy.8 0 According to this view, the hallmark of the self-deceiver
is "bad faith"-the relinquishment of responsibility for personal
actions, the lack of personal integrity, the malaise of "inner dis-
78. H. FINGARETrE, SELF-DECEPTION 34 (1969).
79. Id. at 139, 141. Bok, too, notes the "intricate capacities of each person for
denial, deflection, distortion, and loss of memory," and that "deceptive messages,
whether or not they are lies, can also be more or less affected by self-deception, by
error, and by variations in the actual intention to deceive." LYING: MORAL CHOICE
IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 15-16 (1978).
80. For a discussion of Sartre and Kierkegaard on the subject of self-deception,
see Fingarette, supra note 78 at 92-110.
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integration.""1 Another formulation is that the self-deceiver has
opted for fragmentation instead of unity of the self, and thus is
incapable of acting as a spiritual or ethical agent. 2 Self-decep-
tion is thus seen as the essence of human failure, and is con-
demned on a moral basis.
8 3
The Grenco opinion contains no concern that Cook's
"faulty shading of recollection" indicated any lack of "charac-
ter." This is one problem with the case-the complete lack of
analysis of self-deception as an element of "character," or as an
indicator of Cook's future reliability as a licensee.
Instead, the FCC was consistent with the psychoanalytic,
neutral perspective-noting the "influence" of Cook's "uncon-
scious," at the same time differentiating between self-deceiving
statements and deliberate, outright lies. But even within this
chosen approach, the case presents problems. Having opted for
a psychoanalytic perspective, the FCC could have taken at least
two legitimate paths: to provide some guidance as to how the
FCC should make such sophisticated distinctions on a regular
basis or at least how the FCC made such a distinction in the case
of Cook; or to say that, given the acknowledged ambiguity of the
problem, an administrative licensing agency would do well to
abandon this kind of inquiry as irrelevant to its mandate, and
adopt an altogether different way of handling instances of misin-
formation. The Commission did neither. It offered no explana-
tion of its decision to put Cook's testimony in one category
rather than another, and no suggestions for disposition of future
cases. It used its recognition of the ambiguity of the uncon-
scious merely as a reason to exonerate Cook-never acknowl-
81. Id. at 96, where Fingarette discusses Sartre's BEING AND NOTHINGNESS.
82. Id. at 104, where Fingarette discusses Kierkegaard's ErrHER/OR, Vol. II; PU-
RITY OF HEART; and THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH.
83. A third school of thought, represented by Fingarette himself, Id. at 136-150,
departs from both the neutral and judgemental approaches, and holds that an individ-
ual's move into self-deception is "morally ambiguous." Id. at 136. On the one hand,
self-deception is viewed as a "spiritual disorder" involving a "rejection of personal
responsibility," Id at 82, 141; on the other hand, "[t]he greater the integrity of the
person, and the more powerful the contrary individual inclinations, the greater the
temptation to self-deception." Iad at 140. As Professor Fingarette explains: "It is
because the movement into self-deception is rooted in a concern for integrity of spirit
that we temper our condemnation of the self-deceiver. We feel that he is not a mere
cheat. We are moved to a certain compassion in which there is awareness of the self-
deceiver's authentic inner dignity as the motive of his self-betrayal." Id
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edging the possibility that its psychological insights showed the
severe limitations-perhaps futility-of the intent standard in
the context of allocating broadcast licenses.
Commissioner Johnson, dissenting, refused to accept the
finding that Cook's testimony was neither precisely a lie, nor
precisely honest, but a "shading" somewhere in the middle.
Johnson noted that Cook had not once claimed a failure of mem-
ory; Johnson also maintained that the ALJ's "first hand" exami-
nation of Cook's demeanor should be given great weight. s4 In
Johnson's view, the FCC's opinion was best explained as "a des-
perate desire to avoid imposing the penalty which inevitably fol-
lows from a finding of misrepresentation."' 5 Johnson was
melancholy at the prospect: "When we come to the point where
we are no longer willing to ensure that our licensees exhibit hon-
esty in proceedings before this Commission, then we are surely
lost."'8 6
The Grenco formula is popular with the current FCC, par-
ticularly the Review Board."7 But it has spawned perplexing de-
84. 39 F.C.C.2d at 740, 26 R.R.2d at 1053. Johnson wrote: "When Cook, who
recalled numerous historical details,. . . denied the substance of the conversation as
related by [another witness], the Administrative Judge informed Cook that there was
a distinct difference between 'not recalling' a conversation and 'denying' that it ever
took place. Mr. Cook, nevertheless, denied the conversation, and the Judge-who,
unlike the majority, had the opportunity to examine the witnesses' demeanor first-
hand-believed [the other witness]. The majority nevertheless attributes this discrep-
ancy in testimony to Cook's 'shady recollection'-a conclusion which makes no sense
on the present record." Id.
85. Id at 741, 26 R.R.2d at 1054.
86. Id.
87. The Review Board is playing an increasingly pivotal role in adjudications at
the FCC. As recounted in Freedman, Review Boards in the Administrative Process,
117 U. PA. L. REv. 546 (1969), the Review Board was the product of a 1961 amend-
ment to the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 155(d)(1), designed to relieve the Com-
mission of the task of reviewing exceptions to all initial decisions of hearing examiners.
In regulations promulgated by the agency in 1962, the Board was established to hear
appeals from hearing examiner decisions in all adjudications except renewal or revoca-
tion proceedings. The latter limitation stemmed from the fact that the FCC "appar-
ently gave Congress informal assurances at the time the amendment was enacted that
review of initial decisions in so-called 'death sentence' cases would remain directly in
the Commission," but as Professor Freedman notes, the exception could not "be justi-
fied on principle." Id. at 550. In December, 1981, the Commission amended its rules
to provide for expanded Review Board Responsibilities. 46 FR 58681, Dec. 3, 1981.
Under Section 0.361 of the FCC rules, the Board may now review initial decisions "in
all adjudicative proceedings unless at the time of designation, the Commission
designates otherwise." Thus, appeals of not only construction permit grants, but also
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cisions. West Jersey Broadcasting8 8 concerned the hearing
testimony of a renewal applicant's principal. On the first day of
testifying, the principal initially denied the existence of certain
unreported stock options, and then said he could not recall
them; on the second day, he corrected himself and was forth-
coming on the matter. Based primarily on unfavorable de-
meanor findings, and the fact that the existence of the options
had been raised well before the hearing by another party, the
ALJ disqualified the applicant for lack of candor. 89 The Review
Board reversed, characterzing the problematic testimony both
as "fleeting or incipient lack of candor" and (citing Grenco) as
"'faulty shading of recollection.' "90 But "lack of candor" logi-
cally signifies intent to deceive, while "faulty shading," at least
as described in Grenco, involves the unconscious and not an in-
tentional lie or omission. Ultimately, the Board seemed to
throw its arms up in confusion as to what it was trying to say,
wondering aloud "whether or not it is theoretically possible to
'prove' or 'disprove' the presence or absence of precise recollec-
tion on this point and from this record." 91 The Board finally
characterized the testimony as a "monetary misstatement, re-
gardless of causation. . ." and a "passing equivocacy . . . in a
timely manner set aright by the witness's own willing expatia-
tion."' 92 At the heart of all this may have been a reasonable judg-
ment that the initial testimony, while likely intentionally evasive,
was not materially so. But since intent to deceive of any kind
could trigger the death penalty, the Board drifted into the con-
tradictions already mentioned-the rather unintelligible twin
findings of lack of candor and Grenco-like "shading."
In Superior Broadcasting of California,93 the Board was
again mired in the Grenco formulation. There a director of a
renewal and revocation proceedings will normally be taken by the Board in the first
instance. The full Commission is still authorized, but not required, to render what
amounts to a third opinion-after the initial decision, and after the Board's review-
upon granting an application for review pursuant to Section 1.115 of the FCC rules.
47 C.F.R. 1.115.
88. 90 F.C.C.2d 363, 51 R.R.2d 1243 (1982).
89. 90 F.C.C.2d 377, 379 (1982); 89 F.C.C.2d 478, 510, 533 (1978) (Initial Deci-
sions in West Jersey).
90. 90 F.C.C.2d at 370, 51 R.R.2d at 1248.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 94 F.C.C.2d 904, 54 R.R.2d 773 (Rev. Bd. 1983).
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VHF television applicant had told the FCC that his 52% inter-
est in another broadcast property was "non-voting" stock. It
was later discovered that he simply "refrain(ed)" from voting
the shares-not that it was "non-voting stock." 94 Citing Grenco,
the Board characterized the misstatement as "heedless shading
of his interests so as to tint those interests with the most
favorable comparative coating"; further, that the statement was
"less than candid" and "concerned a matter of decisional impor-
tance." 95 The Board did not explain how an effort "to tint" fi-
nancial interests (a formulation smacking of intent) could
amount to a "heedless shading" (a phrase which strips away the
notion of intent in the same sentence). Equally puzzling, the
Board imposed a "slight-to-moderate demerit" on the applicant,
whereas in Grenco the FCC awarded no penalty whatsoever for
"shading." On its face, then, the decision can only be sorted out
as a rather remarkable judgment that the misstatement at issue
was somewhat intentional ("tinted"), somewhat unconscious
("shaded"), somewhat careless ("heedless"), and that a slight de-
merit was appropriate. Such are the inevitable contradictions
when "intent to deceive" is disqualifying, when a given record
shows probable intent, but when the Board wishes to impose a
lesser sanction.
The "psychoanalytic" mode, illustrated by Grenco and its
progeny, shows an agency on both solid and sinking ground. On
the one hand, the discussion in Grenco is insightful; self-decep-
tion may well be at the root of many misstatements rendered to
government agencies. On the other hand, self-deception may in-
dicate problems of "character" and unreliability. But, even if all
this is true, the FCC is hardly equipped to be grappling with
such varieties of mental state; the contradictions of West Jersey
and Superior Broadcasting attest to that.
2. The "Literalist" Mode
In other of the "harder" cases, the FCC opts for a second
mode-what I call the "literalist" approach. Here, the Commis-
sion's result is the same as in Grenco-exculpation or at least
non-disqualification-but the framework differs. As explained
94. 94 F.C.C.2d at 908-09, 54 R.R.2d at 776.
95. Id.
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by an ALJ in D.H. Overmyer Communications Company, Inc.,96
a decision recently cited with approval by the Fowler FCC,
[I]t is not the function of the Commission, or of presiding officers, to
pronounce magisterial judgments upon the general truth-telling
propensities of a witness. Decisions are not like a psychiatric report
in which there is an evaluation of a subject's "personality." In deci-
sions there is merely an assessment, on criteria traditionally signifi-
cant, that the witness's testimony should or should not be credited.
The assessment may in fact be unjust to the witness, whose actual
virtues may be in complete contradiction to an unfavorable conclu-
sion on his testimony. For the trier of fact has only the testimony
and the manner of its delivery to go on; he has, of course, no access
to the witness's hidden character.
97
With this premise-that there is "only the testimony and the
manner of its delivery to go on"-the FCC in its literalist mode
examines a party's statement on its face, virtually in isolation
from the circumstances of the case or the question of motive.
The hallmark of this approach is that it is decidedly averse to the
drawing of any inferences.
Several cases are illustrative. In the Overmyer opinion, even
though a licensee's Vice President was found to have committed
a "deliberate, conscious misrepresentation" in an application
prepared under the President's direction, the ALJ chose to
credit the "plausibility, even if only minimal," of the President's
testimony in the absence of "affirmative evidence of malicious
intent. ' 98 The ALJ noted his own "personal disbelief' and even
his "incredulity" at portions of the President's testimony, but
seemed to say that only a smoking pistol ("affirmative evidence
of malicious intent") would suffice to counter a literal reading of
the President's statements.99
Similarly, in KPFWBroadcasting,100 a 1974 case, the Com-
mission rejected Broadcast Bureau allegations that a licensee's
pleadings contained misstatements, on the grounds that the
pleadings, while "pressed to the outer limits of acceptable advo-
cacy, on balance. . . appear to be founded on a plausible inter-
pretation, albeit narrow and self-serving .... 101 The narrow,
96. 56 F.C.C.2d 918 (AL 1974).
97. Id. at 924.
98. Id. at 925-30.
99. Id. at 928.
100. 47 F.C.C.2d 1090, 30 R.R.2d 1239 (1974).
101. Id. at 1095 n.ll, 30 R.R.2d at 1246 n.l1.
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self-serving "plausibility" in KFPW failed to trigger any FCC
discussion on possible lack of candor.
In RKO General, Inc., 102 the FCC in 1980 condemned state-
ments that are "technically correct" but misleading as to the
known facts, and the Court of Appeals firmly stated that the
"duty of candor is basic, and well known." 10 3 But by 1982, the
Fowler Commission was openly willing to accept questionable
but "technically true" statements. In Radio WAVS, Inc.,1°4 one
question was whether a broadcaster had surrendered control of
his station to a proposed transferee before obtaining FCC au-
thorization for the transfer. Intimately tied to the control issue
was a second question-whether either party had lied to the
agency about the participation of the proposed transferee (Har-
old Gore) in a format change implemented while the transfer
application was pending. Such participation, if found, could
lend support to an allegation of unauthorized transfer. The
broadcaster had represented to the FCC that the format change
was suggested by "'Harold Gore, a 5% stockholder,' "105
although it became clear that at the time that Gore proposed the
format change to the broadcaster, Gore was not a stockholder,
but the prospective buyer of the station. Since Gore later did
become a stockholder, the Commission was content that the
statement was "technically correct," and thus not a misrepresen-
tation.106 Nor was the "technically correct" statement found to
be lacking in candor; in fact, although the issue as designated
was whether the parties had "misrepresented facts or were lack-
ing in candor," 10 7 the FCC declined to discuss the candor
question.
The Commission approved this mode again in 1983 when it
declined to review the Review Board's decision in Gross Tele-
casting, Inc. 108 There the Board cited KFPW approvingly in
holding that a licensee's response to an FCC inquiry, while "nar-
rowly responsive" and definitely lacking in candor, was never-
theless "technically accurate" and "literally true," and thus not
102. 78 F.C.C.2d 1, 98 n.421, 47 R.R.2d 921, 999 n.421.
103. RKO General, Inc. v. F.C.C., supra note 4 at 232.
104. 92 F.C.C.2d 1037, 52 R.R.2d 1231 (1982).
105. 92 F.C.C.2d at 1050, 52 R.R.2d at 1242.
106. Id.
107. 92 F.C.C.2d at 1038, 52 R.R.2d at 1232.
108. FCC 83-443 (November 21, 1983).
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a misrepresentation and not disqualifying.10 9 As in Radio
WAVS, there was no discussion of the weight, if any, to be given
to other factors-such as possible motivation-in a case involv-
ing a statement that was deemed to be merely "technically
accurate."
Thus, instead of triggering intensified scrutiny, a finding
that a statement is only technically true can have the effect of
halting the agency's inquiry. Again, the cases suggest an FCC
shying away from a finding of intent to deceive-and hence
avoiding the use of disqualification as a sanction.
3. "Administrative Feel"
A third mode may also be identified-the unenviable meth-
odology known as "administrative feel," 110 "hunch" or "induc-
tion.""' Here the decision-maker neither psychoanalyzes nor
looks only at the literal meaning of the representation. Instead,
the decision-maker plunges headlong into a case, surfacing usu-
ally with a lengthy discussion of the facts and a conclusion. The
resulting opinion may focus on a possible motive for deception;
then again, it may not.1 2 It may rely heavily on the AL's de-
109. Gross Telecasting, Inc., 92 F.C.C.2d 204, 222-223, 52 R.R.2d 851, 864-65
(Rev. Bd. 1982).
110. This memorable term is borrowed from the agency's comparative renewal
saga, Cowles Florida Broadcasting Inc., where the FCC stated: "In reaching [our]
conclusion, we are aware that a measure of subjectiveness is unavoidably involved,
given the absence of standards.. . . But our conclusion is based.. . on our adminis-
trative 'feel' acquired through years of overseeing television operations." 60 F.C.C.2d
372, 422, 37 R.R.2d 1487, 1544 (1976), recon. denied and clarified, 62 F.C.C.2d 953,
39 R.R.2d 541 (1977), recon. denied, - F.C.C.2d -, 40 R.R.2d 1627 (1977), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. F.C.C., 598 F.2d 37
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979), recon. sub nom. Cowles Broad-
casting, Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d 993, 49 R.R.2d 1138 (1981), affd, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir.
1982). In the court's view, "[s]uch intuitional forms of decision-making, completely
opaque to judicial review, fall somewhere on the distant side of arbitrary." 598 F.2d
at 50.
111. These terms were used in the Review Board's scathing reversal of portions of
an Initial Decision involving misrepresentation in WHW Enterprises, Inc., 89
F.C.C.2d 799, 806, 51 R.R.2d 409, 414 (Rev. Bd. 1982).
112. For example, in the initial decision in Gross Telecasting, Inc., 92 F.C.C.2d
250, 426 (1981), the Administrative Law Judge held that the licensee lied in a letter
responding to an agency inquiry on possible clipping practices. The AIJ focused on
motive, noting that the licensee's letter was "intended to resolve, favorably to [the
licensee], any suggestion that [the licensee] may be involved in a most serious viola-
tion." Id. On appeal, the Review Board ignored the discussion of motive. 92
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meanor findings, or allude to their nonbinding effect. 1 3 It may
F.C.C.2d 204, 217-23, 52 R.R.2d 851,861-65 (1982). The F.C.C. declined to review
the case further. FCC 83-443 (Nov. 21, 1983).
Compare New Continental Broadcasting Co., 88 F.C.C.2d 830, 837, 50 R.R.2d
1117, 1124 (Rev. Bd. 1981) ("A determination of lack of candor of misrepresentation
requires evidence of an intention and a motive to deceive, mislead, or conceal."); Scott
& Davis Enterprises, Inc., 88 F.C.C.2d 1090, 1100, 50 R.R.2d 1251, 1259 (Rev. Bd.
1982) (allegations consisting of "list of immaterial errors, oversights, and ambiguities"
in application "no substitute" for "primafacie showing of a logical reason or desire to
deceive. . .."); with Grenco, Inc., 39 F.C.C.2d 732, 735, 26 R.R.2d 1046, 1050 (1973)
(principal denied participating in a strike application; a "mere desire" to "impede and
obstruct" a construction permit application not significant in the absence of evidence
of "some overt act" in furtherance of a strike application).
113. The significance of an AL's opinion-including his demeanor findings---"de-
pends largely on the importance of credibility in the particular case." Universal Cam-
era Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951). The Administrative Procedure Act
provides that an agency reviewing an ALJ's decision "has all the powers which it
would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or
by rule." 5 U.S.C. § 557(b). Thus, as Professor Davis has noted, an agency "may
substitute judgment for that of the examiner on any and all questions, including even
the credibility of the witnesses, whose behavior the examiner observes but the agency
can know only from the record." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 222
(1972). At the FCC, discussion of ALU demeanor findings usually takes place in Re-
view Board decisions, and the amount of the deference to such findings fluctuates from
case to case.
Compare Muncie Broadcasting Corp., 89 F.C.C.2d 123, 129, 51 R.R.2d 46, 51
(Rev. Bd. 1982) (ALJ demeanor findings entitled to "considerable weight"); with
WWH Enterprises, Inc., 89 F.C.C.2d 799, 808, 51 R.R.2d 409, 415 (1982) (Review
Board, dismissing ALJ speculations as to motive, reverses a finding of misrepresenta-
tion, stating that AL's demeanor findings "need not be considered"); West Jersey
Broadcasting Co., 90 F.C.C.2d 363, 369-70, 51 R.R.2d 1243, 1247-48 (1982) (Review
Board reverses AL finding of lack of candor where ALJ based the finding largely on
"careful observation" of witness at hearing).
In Fox River Broadcasting, Inc., 88 F.C.C.2d 1145, 1157 (1981), the Administra-
tive Law Judge, in finding a lack of candor, noted that the principal "displayed a
chamelon-like [sic] glibness" at hearing, and was "both unsuccessful and unconvinc-
ing" in his testimony. On appeal, the Review Board reversed, never addressing that
key finding, but noting generally that review of AL "findings" is not limited to a
"clearly erroneous standard." 88 F.C.C.2d 1132, 1140-41, 50 R.R.2d 1321, 1328
(Rev. Bd. 1982). The full F.C.C., affirming the Board, said only that, while the princi-
pal's statements "may have appeared to the ALJ as 'glib' they do not establish any
overt or intentional deception." 93 F.C.C.2d 127, 129, 53 R.R.2d 44, 46 (1983). Dis-
senting, Commissioner Jones complained about the FCC's failure to come to grips
with the AL's demeanor findings: "In deciding the always elusive question of truth-
fulness, the AL had the benefit both of the record of [the principal's] apparently
inconsistent statements and his observation of [the principal's] demeanor while at-
tempting to reconcile them. The Board, and in turn we, have only the lifeless record.
In this situation, it seems to me that the AL's finding that [the principal] had lied
should be affirmed unless it is clear from the record that it was wrong, and in my
judgment that is not the case." Id. at 130-31, 53 R.R.2d at 47.
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find significance in the fact that material information not pro-
vided by a party was susceptible of knowledge, or it may ignore
such a fact or possibility. 114 The result is based seemingly on the
"feel" of the case, and not on any list of factors or considera-
tions; a party losing before an ALJ may take heart in the pros-
pect that the facts may elicit a different "feel," "hunch," or
"induction" higher in the adjudicatory ladder. Prime examples
are the case of American International Development, Inc.," 5 con-
sidered in Part III, and the Fox River Broadcasting'1 6 case, con-
sidered in Part IV.
4. "Human Frailty"
A fourth approach in the "harder" cases can be called the
"human frailty" mode. Here, even the FCC is apparently
abashed at the prospect of exonerating a party on the basis of
unconscious "shading," with a finding that the representations
are somehow "technically true," or with a finding based on the
feel of a case. In the "human frailty" mode, the party's intent to
114. Compare Western Communications, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1441, 1450, 37 R.R.2d
999, 1010 (1976), affd sub norn. Las Vegas Valley Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 589
F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979) (renewal applicant dis-
qualified for misrepresentations of station managers; principal "failed to take adequate
precautions to insure the responses were accurate and complete. . . . [N]o adequate
investigation was conducted by the licensee to determine the true situation at the sta-
tions.") with Action Radio, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 803, 806, 33 R.R.2d 51, 55 (1975) (re-
newal applicant relied "to an unwarranted extent upon information supplied by its
program director," failed "to interview persons with knowledge of the subject matter
of the Commission's inquiries," and failed "to submit full and complete responses to
such inquiries" resulting "in the submission of inaccurate and incomplete statements
which could have, and should have, been avoided;" nevertheless, licensee's responses
to FCC not found to be misrepresentations). In Gross Telecasting Inc., supra note
108, the ALU noted the quickness of the licensee's response to an agency inquiry, and
commented that neither the principal nor his chief employee "made any review of logs
and conducted no investigation." 92 F.C.C.2d at 426. The implication was that
Gross Telecasting had information at its disposal which would have made its repre-
sentations to the Commission complete and accurate, and that Gross Telecasting's
failure to include such information was indicative of intent to deceive. On appeal, the
Review Board asserted that "[w]hile the station may have in-advisedly attempted to
minimize its culpability by omitting mention of [that information], that shortcoming
in itself does not support a conclusion of misrepresentation." 92 F.C.C.2d at 222, 52
R.R.2d at 864.
115. 75 F.C.C.2d 67 (1979), rev'd in part, 75 F.C.C.2d 109, 46 R.R.2d 1177 (Rev.
Bd. 1979), result afl'd, 86 F.C.C.2d 808, 49 R.R.2d 1029 (1981).
116. 88 F.C.C.2d 1132, 50 R.R.2d 1321 (Rev. Bd. 1982), af'd 93 F.C.C.2d 127, 53
R.R.2d 44 (1983).
Number 3]
432 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol.37
deceive is inescapable, leading the FCC to find other ways
around its own standard.
In two related opinions, the FCC determined that the Presi-
dent of CBS network had exhibited an "apparent willingness to
be less than candid" with the Commission,117 and had possibly
"lied to the Commission investigators" about promotions for a
series of CBS-aired tennis matches. 1 The FCC also noted that
"CBS apparently lacks adequate controls to insure that high
level officers responsible for network operations do not misrepre-
sent facts to the Commission. ' 19 Nevertheless, the FCC spared
the network even the burden of a hearing on whether the misrep-
resentations justify revocation of CBS's licenses. The sanction
deemed appropriate was mild: a short-term renewal for a single
CBS television station. The FCC explained that network man-
agement was not accustomed to "direct contact" with FCC staff,
and may have been unaware of the seriousness of lying;20 more-
over, in such a "highly competitive corporate environment, ap-
parent misrepresentations to the Commission may have been
made in order to protect the careers of the individuals in-
volved." 1 21 Thus, the frailty of top CBS executives, buffeted as
they are by the high winds of cut-throat intra-corporate compe-
tition, was essentially exculpatory.
In another case, Janus Broadcasting Company, 22 a licensee
who had lied to the Commission later "recanted"-but only af-
ter a former employee blew the whistle and notified the FCC of
the lie. The Commission found the misrepresentation to be "se-
rious" but again spared the licensee from disqualification on
"human frailty" grounds:
The seriousness of the misrepresentation is mitigated somewhat
... by [the licensee's] explanation that he had no intention to lie to
Commission investigators when he went into the interview, but that
when faced with the question of admitting what he regarded to be
minor error, he took the easy way out.1
23
117. CBS, Inc., Tennis Match, 67 F.C.C.2d 969, 975, 42 R.R.2d 863, 870 (1978).
118. CBS, Inc., 69 F.C.C.2d 1082, 1091, 43 R.R.2d 1085, 1094-95 (1978).
119. 69 F.C.C.2d at 1091, 43 R.R.2d at 1095.
120. Id. at 1092, 43 R.R.2d at 1096.
121. Id. at 1092-93, 43 R.R.2d at 1096.
122. 78 F.C.C.2d 788, 47 R.R.2d 805 (1980).
123. Id. at 791-92, 47 R.R.2d at 808. Three Commissioners dissented, stating that
the majority "glosses over the fact that this 'recantation' in effect came at the point of
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Today's FCC is also sympathetic to this fourth mode. In
Coastal Bend Family Television, Inc.,12 4 the Review Board found
a "serious lack of candor bordering on misrepresentation"; the
statements at issue were deemed "fanciful," "disingenuous," and
containing "an element of hocus pocus. ' 125 But, in a rather
astonishing conclusion, the Board refused to disqualify the appli-
cant, ruling that because the record "reveals so many blunders
and miscues. . . they cast doubt on the willfulness of [the appli-
cant's] intent to deceive." Since "the distinction between willful
and clumsy lack of candor is sufficiently blurred," the Board im-
posed the "slightly lesser sanction of a substantial demerit."
126
This opinion provides a distressing variation on the "human
frailty" mode. In CBS and Janus, the FCC at least was willing
to hold straightforwardly that intentional deception had taken
place. In Coastal Bend, the Board appears initially to find inten-
tional deception, but immediately reverses its characterization
when faced with the choice of sanctions. The plentitude of mis-
statements becomes a reason, not for total disqualification, but
for doubts as to the "willfulness" of the applicant's intent to
deceive-as if the Board could surgically remove "willfulness"
from "intent." None too deftly, the Board transmutes "disin-
genuous" lack of candor into "clumsy" human frailty in the
span of a few sentences, and then declines to disqualify.' 27 A
reasonable, if strange, conclusion from the case would be that if
one's misstatements are sufficiently numerous, it may be possible
to argue that the sheer volume alone indicates lack of intent to
deceive.
The fact that a reader of FCC cases can identify multiple
agency approaches to misrepresentation cases highlights this Ar-
ticle's basic concern: the intent test's chameleon-like ability to
become whatever the decision-maker wishes it to be. Without a
definition of factors to be considered in each case, the decision-
maker has maximum discretion to imbue the inquiry with
whatever considerations seem useful or convenient at the time.
a gun. In so doing, the Majority encourages 'stonewalling' from licensees who find
themselves in [a similar] position." Id. at 795, 47 R.R.2d at 810.
124. 94 F.C.C.2d 648, 54 R.R.2d 367 (Rev. Bd. 1983).
125. 94 F.C.C.2d at 658-59, 54 R.R.2d at 374.
126. Id. at 659, 54 R.R.2d at 374 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 658-59, 54 R.R.2d at 374.
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Moreover, with these precedents, broadcasters may be justified
in assuming that the WOKO message is a thing of the past, and
that if one's lies are less obvious than those of WMOZ, Western
Communications, RKO, and Nick Chaconas, the risk of telling
them may be an acceptable business decision to make.
III. ONE MIND, THREE MENTAL STATES
Another aspect of misrepresentation before the FCC is the
unhappy collision of the intent test with the FCC's tri-level adju-
dicatory system and the burden of proof required to establish
intent to deceive.
FCC cases can pass through three decision-makers. 128 The
ALJ conducts a hearing, and issues an initial Decision; the Re-
view Board hears appeals and essentially considers the matters
in controversy de novo; the full Commission in its discretion may
grant an application for review and thereby agree to give the
case a third independent assessment. Given the subjectivity of
the intent test, it is therefore possible for each level within the
FCC to characterize a party's mental state in a different way.
The chance of obtaining three quite different results is
heightened when each level decides the case based on the pre-
ponderance of the evidence. That evidentiary standard, of
course, merely requires the fact-finder to believe that "the facts
asserted are more probably true than false."' 129 In the 1981 case
of Steadman v. S.E. C.,130 the Supreme Court upheld the prepon-
derance of evidence standard as appropriate for SEC administra-
tive hearings on charges of fraud. The Court explictly rejected a
series of lower court cases calling for a "clear and convincing
evidence" standard in such cases.1 31 The full FCC and the Re-
128. See 47 C.F.R. § 0.341 (1984) (authority of Administrative Law Judges); 47
C.F.R. § 0.361 (1984) (authority of Review Board); 47 C.F.R. § 1.115 (1984) (proce-
dures for filing applications of review with the full Commission).
129. McBaine, Burden of Proof- Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. REv. 242, 262
(1944).
130. 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
131. Id. at 95. In Sea Island Broadcasting Corp. v. F.C.C., 627 F.2d 240 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), the court held that revocation of an FCC license was governed by the
"clear and convincing" standard, citing Collins Security Corp. v. S.E.C., 562 F.2d 820
(D.C. Cir. 1977), one of the cases later to be disapproved by the Supreme Court in
Steadman. In the wake of Steadman, the FCC has held in a renewal proceeding that
misrepresentation can be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Lewel
Broadcasting, Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d 896, 914, 49 R.R.2d 871, 885-86 (1981). In Lewel,
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view Board have acknowledged Steadman as confirming the bur-
den of proof required in FCC misrepresentation cases,
132
although the Commission more recently has indicated that an-
other formulation ("clear, precise, and indubitable" evidence)
may now be appropriate.
133
Assuming for the moment that Steadman applies, it is hard
to quibble with the appropriateness of "preponderance of the ev-
idence" as a standard for the AL. But its use in the de novo
appellate considerations of the Review Board and FCC, espe-
cially in misrepresentation cases, is another matter altogether.
In the frequently "close" misrepresentation cases, whether a fact
is determined to be "more probably true than false"-i.e.,
whether the scales tip more one way than the other-may de-
pend on the eye of the beholder, as well as on the beholder's
chosen "approach" to the issue.
The case of American International Development, Inc. 134 il-
lustrates the possibilities. Three parties filed competing applica-
tions for a new FM station in Phoenix: American International
Development, Inc. ("AID"), Herbert W. Owens, Jr. ("Owens"),
and KXIV, Inc. ("KXIV"). The parties, as usual, traded
charges of misrepresentation and other offenses. The FCC des-
ignated a list of issues for hearing-including issues to determine
whether either AID, Owens or KXIV tried to deceive the FCC
in the application process.
The chart below shows the outcomes of the misrepresenta-
tion issues as the case traveled from the ALJ, to the Review
the FCC distinguished renewal proceedings from the revocation context of Sea Island:
"Because the Communications Act affords the licensee significantly less security at the
end of, than during, the license term, we do not believe that Sea Island requires proof
by 'clear and convincing' evidence in renewal proceedings." Id. at 914, 49 R.R.2d at
886. Whether the Sea Island standard remains appropriate for revocations, given
Steadman, is open to question; the Review Board has already ventured that Steadman
"implicitly overrul[es]" Sea Island. Fox River Broadcasting, Inc., 88 F.C.C.2d 1132,
1136 n.9, 50 R.R.2d 1321, 1324 n.9 (1982).
132. Lewel Broadcasting Co., Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d at 914, 49 R.R.2d at 885-86
(1981); Fox River Broadcasting, Inc., 88 F.C.C.2d at 1136 n.9, 50 R.R.2d at 1324 n.9.
See also Central Texas Broadcasting Co., Ltd., 90 F.C.C.2d 583, 597, 51 R.R.2d 1478,
1488 (Rev. Bd. 1982) (sep. statement of Member Jacobs), recon. denied, 92 F.C.C.2d
914, 52 R.R.2d 1383 (Rev. Bd. 1982).
133. Riverside Broadcasting Co., Inc., 53 R.R.2d 1154, 1157 (1983), affid 56
R.R.2d 618 (1984). See infra Part V.
134. 75 F.C.C.2d 67 (AL 1979), rev'd in part, 75 F.C.C.2d 109, 46 R.R.2d 1177
(Rev. Bd. 1979), result affld, 86 F.C.C.2d 808, 49 R.R.2d 1029 (1981).
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Board, to the FCC. The ALJ disqualified Owens and KXIV for
misrepresentation; cleared AID of misrepresentation; and
awarded the license to AID. Six months later, the Review
Board disqualified Owens and AID; cleared KXIV; and picked
KXIV as the winner. After another eighteen months, the full
Commission disqualified Owens; cleared AID; cleared KXIV of
disqualifying acts of misrepresentation; assessed AID and KXIV
comparatively; and gave AID the license.
ALI Review Bd. FCC
AID no misrepresentation no
misrepresentation misrepresentation
KXIV misrepresentation no no disqualifying
misrepresentation misrepresentation
OWENS misrepresentation misrepresentation misrepresentation
Winner AID KXIV AID
The allegation against AID was that certain signatures of
AID's principal, Mrs. Zozoya, were forged by her husband in
documents filed with the FCC, including the application.
KXIV, in its effort to "uncover any basic qualifying flaws that
might exist" in the AID application, had hired a "documents
expert" who testified that several of the Zozoya signatures were
forgeries. 13 5 At hearing, Mrs. Zozoya, who was legally blind,
conceded that some of the signatures in question were not hers,
but that she had indeed signed both certification pages on the
application and a loan commitment letter.
The ALJ found that Mrs. Zozoya's signatures were genuine
and therefore that AID was innocent of the misrepresentation
charges. His opinion first considered the demeanor of the par-
ties; he concluded that both Mrs. Zozoya and the expert were
credible witnesses. He was then left with the question of which
testimony was more probably true. While the expert was "forth-
right and honest," the expert's testimony-that Mrs. Zozoya
had signed only one of the two pages of the application-"just
[didn't] make sense," was "inconsistent with human knowledge
and experience," and was "improbable." 136 This appeared to be
the AL's way of saying that the preponderance of evidence fa-
vored AID. There was no discussion of possible motive or
135. 75 F.C.C.2d at 85.
136. Id. at 87.
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whether the alleged misrepresentation could be considered
material.
The Review Board had a sharply different view of the pre-
ponderance of the evidence. Acknowledging only briefly "the
judge's advantage in seeing and hearing the witnesses person-
ally," the Board disclaimed any binding power of demeanor
findings. 137 The Board then rejected the AL's conclusion-that
the expert's testimony was "improbable" and "inconsistent with
human knowledge and experience"-as abstract and "un-
sound." 138 The Board then assessed the expert's experience
much more favorably than had the AL. Finally, the Board dis-
closed that it, too, had examined the signatures, and that it
would be "impossible" to consider them genuine. 139 The pre-
ponderance of the evidence-the expert's opinion and the
Board's own perusal of the signatures-showed that the signa-
tures were forgeries and that Mrs. Zozoya (and therefore AID)
had "pursued a conscious course of misrepresentation" at the
hearing.' 40 The Board also suggested a possible motive but con-
ceded there was no "direct evidence" of it. 141
The full Commission then took a third look at the question:
Based on our careful review of the record, we believe that the
Board's analysis must be rejected. Our disagreement with the
Board is fundamental: we are simply not convinced that the dis-
puted signatures are forgeries. Because of this conviction, we shall
resolve the signature/misrepresentation issue in AID's favor, re-
versing the Board's disqualification.
142
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission accorded weight to
the AL's demeanor findings, scoffed at the suggested possible
motive, and relied in part on its own independent appraisal of
the signatures. The Commission's view of the preponderance of
the evidence was simply that "it is conceivable" that Mrs.
Zozoya signed all the documents.
143
Even greater disparities marked the opinions of the three
levels with respect to the mental state of KXIV. Knowing that
137. Id. at 126, 46 R.R.2d at 1191.
138. Id. at 126-27, 46 R.R.2d at 1191-92.
139. Id. at 128, 46 R.R.2d at 1192.
140. Id. at 128, 46 R.R.2d at 1193.
141. Id. at 129, 46 R.R.2d at 1193.
142. 86 F.C.C.2d at 815, 49 R.R.2d at 1035.
143. Id. at 817, 49 R.R.2d at 1036.
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it could lose the contest under the standard comparative issue,
KXIV had "sought to bolster its comparative posture by re-
questing permission to show that it had an unusually good
broadcast record." 1" KXIV filed a pleading stating it would
show that (1) its public affairs programming in a given period
exceeded that of all 27 other stations in the Phoenix market;
(2) its news coverage exceeded all other Phoenix radio broad-
casters except one, an all-news station; (3) KXIV had brought
one of the first woman-moderated public affairs shows to the
Phoenix market; and (4) it had pioneered one of the few regu-
larly-scheduled drive-time public affairs shows. 145 The ALJ
granted KXIV permission to adduce this information at trial;
KXIV then withdrew the request. Owens moved for a misrepre-
sentation issue against KXIV, maintaining, on the basis of
KXIV's logs, that KXIV had lied to the agency about its past
broadcast record.
146
The logs were devastating. They showed that (1) contrary
to KXIV's assertions, its public affairs programming in the given
period did not exceed that of all other stations, but was a distant
second; (2) KXIV was third in news coverage, rather than sec-
ond; (3) KXIV's female announcer hosted an entertainment
show, rather than a public affairs program, and was on the air
regularly for only four months; and (4) the drive-time show was
predominantly entertainment, not public affairs.147
On this issue, the ALJ omitted any discussion of demeanor,
but reached a conclusion as to KXIV's mental state on the basis
of the number of misstatements, their materiality, and a possible
motive. The pattern suggested that KXIV was engaged in "out-
right falsehoods," and did not deserve the "benefit of the
doubt.""14  The statements went clearly beyond immaterial
"puffery," since programs represented as "public affairs" had al-
ways been logged at KXIV as "entertainment."' 149 Finally, in
the ALJ's view, KXIV may have been motivated by the desire to
induce the other parties to settle. Interestingly, the ALJ con-
144. 75 F.C.C.2d at 88.
145. Id. at 88-89.
146. Id. at 89.
147. Id. at 89-91.
148. Id. at 103.
149. Id.
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demned the conduct not on "character" grounds but because
such pleadings "abuse or burden the Commission's
processes."
1 50
On appeal, the Review Board disagreed with the ALJ, find-
ing that three of KXIV's four statements were innocent "mis-
characterizations," and that only the fourth was "categorically
wrong and unexplained."'' The Board apparently felt that the
misinformation was immaterial since the shows erroneously la-
belled as "public affairs" did contain some public affairs "ele-
ments."' 152 Of most importance to the Board was the lack of a
plausible motive: the fact that KXIV filed the pleading to seek a
hearing on its past performance "negates any suggestion of de-
ception."'153 Thus, the Board's view of the preponderance of the
evidence was that the document was an "exaggeration . .. not
the sort of calculated deception that destroys a reasonable expec-
tation of reliability."' 54 Having disqualified AID on the basis of
the so-called forged signatures, the Board ruled that KXIV's
"exaggerations" were not disqualifying, and that KXIV de-
served the license.
The full Commission, on appeal, produced a result as to
KXIV that was different from either the AL's or the Board's.
The FCC first nodded in favor of the Board in noting that sev-
eral of KXIV's statements were arguably exaggerations and that
only one was "categorically false and unexplained."' 55 The FCC
then approved the AL's sentiment that KXIV, in each instance,
knew or should have known that the statements were false, and
that such an irresponsible pleading must be condemned.
56
Then, without any discussion of (a) motive; (b) materiality;
(c) mitigating factors; (d) the preponderance of the evidence; or
(e) the fact that KXIV had been completely disqualified by the
ALJ, the FCC simply imposed a "substantial comparative de-
merit" on KXIV. 157 Escaping the death penalty, but saddled
150. Id
151. Id. at 136-37, 46 R.R.2d at 1198.
152. Id
153. Id. at 136, 46 R.R.2d at 1198.
154. Id.
155. 86 F.C.C.2d at 817, 49 R.R.2d at 1036.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 818, 49 R.R.2d at 1037.
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with a damaging demerit in addition to other comparative weak-
nesses, KXIV lost the contest to AID.
This case, with its astonishing range of opinions on whether
AID or KXIV were liars, is an example of the "administrative
feel" approach-virtually a parody of the arbitrariness of mis-
representation cases. FCC personnel spent some four years
probing, re-probing, and probing yet again the inner thoughts of
radio applicants. The inquiry was blatantly subjective: de-
meanor was considered in one instance, not at all in another;
speculations as to likely motives were raised at one level, ridi-
culed at the next; statements were deemed material or immate-
rial-but imprecisely, at best. The combination--of tri-level
adjudication, the intent test, and the preponderance of evidence
standard-produced only head-spinning verbiage. More impor-
tant, the final agency word-the Commission's-was simply
that: the final word, the end of the road. There is no sense in
the AID case that the multiplicity of review succeeded in win-
nowing out nonessentials and narrowing in on an ultimate find-
ing of who, if anyone, intended to deceive.
IV. DISCUSSION FROM WITHIN: THE Fox RIVER CASE
In January, 1982, the Review Board issued its opinion in
Fox River Broadcasting, Inc.,1'58 containing a lengthy discourse
on the offense of misrepresentation, the agency's policy interests,
and the appropriate sanctions. While it was a major agency dis-
cussion of misrepresentation, the Board's opinion-and the
FCC's subsequent disavowal-did nothing to solve the problems
raised thus far in this Article.
The Board's comments in Fox River did not arise in a vac-
uum; two factors most likely were instrumental. First, the Com-
mission had issued its decision in RKO some eighteen months
before, with President Carter still in the White House and his
appointee, Chairman Ferris, heading the FCC.1 59 In the wake of
that decision, charges of misrepresentation and lack of candor
assumed even more prominence than usual in pleadings before
the Commission. 6° As the Board stated in Fox River, "... an
158. 88 F.C.C.2d 1132, 50 R.R.2d 1321 (Rev. Bd. 1982).
159. RKO General, Inc., 78 F.C.C.2d 1, 47 R.R.2d 921 (1980).
160. "Since September I of 1981 the [Review] Board has heard oral argument in
sixteen cases, and in half of them it was alleged that one or more of the applicants had
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unfamiliar reader would deduce that our processing files are a
collective rap sheet of the nation's pathological liars."161 Thus,
the Board clearly believed it time to discourage misuse .of the
misrepresentation charge, and Fox River was an opportunity to
deliver a distinct warning to broadcasters and their lawyers.
Second, the Court of Appeals had issued its own decision in
RKO less than two months before Fox River, upholding nonre-
newal of one of RKO's stations on the basis of "lack of can-
dor." 162 By the time of the court's decision, Ronald Reagan had
become President and had appointed new leadership to the FCC.
The Review Board's Fox River opinion may have been a vehicle
to float an interpretation of the RKO litigation within a politi-
cally reconstituted FCC, to send a signal to industry on the new
Commission's sense of the outcome in RKO, and to indicate how
that Commission might handle charges of misrepresentation and
lack of candor in the future. 163
The background for the Board's discussion in Fox River is
the ALJ's decision to disqualify an applicant for misrepresenta-
tion.164 Taking the case on exceptions, the Board was concerned
that the hearing had been an "undisciplined, adversarial romp in
pursuit of some elusive 'smoking gun,'" and that the FCC's mis-
representation cases in general lacked "lucidity."1 65  Citing the
misrepresented, been less than candid, or had failed to report as required by § 1.65 of
the Commission's rules." Millard Orick, Jr., 89 F.C.C.2d 571, 572, 51 R.R.2d 166,
167 (Rev. Bd. 1982).
161. Fox River Broadcasting, Inc., 88 F.C.C.2d at 1139 n.15, 50 R.R.2d at 1376
n.15.
162. RKO General, Inc. v. FCC, 670 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
163. This speculation was suggested by KRASNOW, LONGLEY, TERRY, The Politics
of Broadcast Regulation 235-36 n.66 (1982), where the authors refer to a Washington
Post story of May 20, 1981, headlined "Reconstituted FCC Votes to Restudy RKO
Ruling." As Krasnow, Longley and Terry state: "[The Post] reported that a five-
member FCC, under Chairman Robert E. Lee, voted to ask the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, to which RKO had appealed, to return the case
to the FCC. The strategy had been suggested by RKO's lawyers, obviously hopeful of
a different outcome under the Republican-led FCC of 1981. A few weeks later, how-
ever, the new general counsel of that FCC notified RKO that the Commission would
not, after all, ask the case to be returned; court review continued, and the FCC started
an inquiry into whether character was relevant to licensing. See Gen. Docket 81-500,
Policy Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcasting Licensing, 46 Fed. Reg.
40899 (1981). In December 1981, the court affirmed the FCC's decision in the
WNAC-TV (Boston proceedings [in RKO]....
164. 88 F.C.C.2d 1145 (AII 1981).
165. 88 F.C.C.2d at 1139, 1134, 50 R.R.2d at 1326, 1323 (Rev. Bd. 1982).
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agency's need to "return to precision," the Board first acknowl-
edged the "generic concept of accuracy," and ventured that two
quite distinct offenses exist under that rubric-misrepresentation
and lack of candor. 166 Each offense, in this view, has a separate
definition and underlying policy; in most cases, the Board indi-
cated, the offenses should trigger different sanctions as well.167
The Board defined misrepresentation as "a false statement
of an objective fact intentionally made to deceive."' 168 Aban-
doning the WOKO language that materiality is unimportant so
long as there is a "willingness to deceive," the Board maintained
that the elements should be those of misrepresentation made to
the federal government under the Criminal Code: a statement,
falsity, materiality, intent, and agency jurisdiction. The underly-
ing policy was said to be the government's interest in condemn-
ing intentionally false submissions; the sanction, "total
disqualification."1
6 9
But the Board's far more interesting discussion centered on
"lack of candor"-the term used by the Court of Appeals less
than two months before in describing RKO's misconduct.170 In
the Board's schema, lack of candor was a lesser offense, "not
stigmatizing" and "scarcely criminal."' 171 The Board suggested
that a wholly different policy informed this offense-the FCC's
interest in licensing worthy trustees of a scarce public re-
source.72 Finally, according to the Board, the sanction for lack
of candor would not be disqualification unless there was intent
to deceive.'
73
At this point, the Board's discussion becomes particularly
intriguing. For in its non-disqualifying "lack of candor" cate-
gory, the Board placed the "harder" cases-those dealing with
"shading of recollection," evasiveness, exaggeration, puffing, and
"technically true" but unedifying statements. 1'" In those cases,
the FCC had declined to disqualify because intent had not been
166. Id. at 1134, 50 R.R.2d at 1323.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1135, 50 R.R.2d at 1324.
169. Id. at 1136-37, 50 R.R.2d at 1324-25.
170. 670 F.2d at 228.
171. 88 F.C.C.2d at 1136-37, 50 R.R.2d at 1325.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1137, 50 R.R.2d at 1325.
174. Id.
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proven. But what the Board in Fox River did not acknowledge
was that the FCC had never referred to the conduct in those
cases as "lack of candor." The Board's purpose in Fox River,
then, begins to become clear: to recast those "harder" cases as
"lack of candor" cases not involving intent to deceive, and thus
to create a category on the order of "unintentional lack of can-
dor." The Board betrayed no awareness of a probable contradic-
tion in terms: if one lacks candor, presumably one intends to
lack candor. But the Board seemed willing to sacrifice plain
meaning for its apparent goal of establishing a saving category
for parties who clearly lack candor but whom the FCC does not
wish to disqualify, for whatever reason.
But why go to such lengths? Perhaps the new category was
designed for a case such as RKO. For the Board in Fox River
next pronounced the startling view that the Court of Appeals
had "fully exonerated" RKO on charges of misrepresentation,
and that there had been a "lack of evidence to show intent to
mislead" in that case.1 75 If the characterization of the court's
opinion in RKO were true, then under the Board's Fox River
analysis, RKO deserved to keep its licenses. Thus, the Board's
convoluted message in Fox River may have simply been that
RKO's disqualification for "lack of candor" was wrong-or at
least that the reconstituted Commission could find a way to
avoid that outcome in the future. The Board's new category
would be available to save the next RKO.
The Board's opinion can thus be seen as an effort to ham-
mer "misrepresentation" and "lack of candor" into two distinct
offenses, as a prelude to splitting "lack of candor" into two types
of its own-thus clearing the way for a saving category of unin-
tentional (and hence non-disqualifying) lack of candor. It is this
puzzling-and, on its face, unintelligible-category which I have
already remarked upon in discussing West Jersey Broadcasting
and Superior Broadcasting, two Review Board cases which fol-
low Fox River. 76 The category becomes somewhat less puz-
zling-but hardly reassuring-if one reads the Board's
conclusions in West Jersey and Superior, as I do, as finding lack
of candor which is indeed deliberate but which, in the Board's
175. 88 F.C.C.2d at 1135, n.4, 50 R.R.2d at 1323, n.4.
176. See supra Section I1(b).
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view, is insufficiently grave to merit disqualification. Thus, the
Board's enterprise in Fox River may have been to lay the
groundwork for sparing applicants who intend to deceive but
whose lies are not considered material. Since such an enterprise
would, however, conflict with the WOKO's condemnation of any
"willingness to deceive," great or small, the Board couched its
new category as unintended (rather than immaterial) lack of
candor.
Aside from its central problem-the paradoxical category
of "unintended lack of candor"-the Board's Fox River opinion
is unpersuasive in its effort to make two distinct offenses of mis-
representation and lack of candor. For example, the Board
badly strains in indentifying separate policy premises for the
two. In fact, both the agency and the courts have frequently
cited both policies as underlying its concern for deceit of any
kind.
1 77
The full Commission's opinion in Fox River178 disagreed
with the Review Board's in all but the result. According to the
FCC, the Board "overstate[d] the distinction" between misrepre-
sentation and lack of candor; since both are based on deceit,
"they differ only in form."' 179 Without elaboration, the FCC also
disavowed the "suggestion that lack of candor may involve fail-
ures to provide information in the absence of any deceptive in-
tent."18 The Board's new category was thus rejected, as was the
Board's interpretation of RKO: "Our reading of the court's
opinion indicates that the court recognized the element of decep-
tion present there." 81 Thus, the FCC affirmed the primacy of
intent as the central element of both misrepresentation or lack of
candor.
And yet, for all this, the Board and the FCC differed only in
their paths to the same result: in effect, the Board would reserve
the right to decline to disqualify an individual by holding that
his lack of candor was unintentional; the FCC would achieve the
177. See, e.g., Leflore Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 454, 461 (D.C. Cir.
1980); RKO General, Inc. v. FCC, supra note 4, 670 F.2d at 232.
178. 93 F.C.C.2d 127, 53 R.R.2d 44 (1983).
179. Id. at 129, 53 R.R.2d at 46.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 129, n.10, 53 R.R.2d at 46, n.10.
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same result by holding that the individual never lacked candor
in the first place.
This distinction is borne out in the Board's and the Com-
mission's respective discussions of the facts in Fox River. The
Board's portrayal, geared to reflect its new category, was awe-
somely convoluted and unconvincing. The statements at issue
were found to lack candor, as too "categorical," as "neglecting"
to be precise, and as going beyond "exaggeration," "puffing" or
"mired memory." 182 And yet, the statements were also found to
be based on the applicant's "reasonable belief' in what he said,
and to follow "a coherent, plausible scenario. "183 The applicant
thus passed a subjective fault test (no intent to deceive), but
failed an objective fault test (negligence) although he did have a
"reasonable belief' in his statement. All in all, we have a most
curious finding of something like reasonably unreasonable be-
havior! Disqualification was, of course, avoided, but a compara-
tive demerit was assessed.
The Commission's performance was not much better.
While the ALJ and the Review Board had focused on misstate-
ments made in an application amendment, the Commission inex-
plicably concentrated on deposition testimony. 184 According to
its opinion, a misstatement in that testimony amounted merely
to a "spontaneous misjudgment" made "under the pressure of
cross-examination;" moreover, the misstatement was later "rec-
tified when called to [the speaker's] attention" by a "subsequent
pleading." 1 85 The Commission was therefore able to combine
the Grenco approach ("spontaneous misjudgment") and the
"human frailty" approach ("pressure of cross-examination") to
conclude that the applicant exhibited no trace of intent to
deceive, and thus engaged in neither misrepresentation nor lack
of candor. The FCC was thus true to its formulation in Fox
River: it avoided disqualifying the applicant not by using the
"unintended lack of candor" category, but by finding no lack of
candor in the first place. But the FCC retained the Board's pen-
alty of a slight demerit, on the ground that the applicant's state-
182. 88 F.C.C.2d at 1142-43, 50 R.R.2d at 1329.
183. Id. at 1141-43, 50 R.R.2d at 1328-29.
184. 88 F.C.C.2d at 1156; 88 F.C.C.2d at 1138, 50 R.R.2d at 1326; 93 F.C.C.2d at
128, 53 R.R.2d at 45-46.
185. 93 F.C.C.2d at 129, 53 R.R.2d at 46.
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ments were careless.
186
The occasion in Fox River to bring order and sense to this
area of FCC adjudications was therefore lost. Instead, both the
Board and the FCC, in their own ways, sought to keep maxi-
mum discretion in the hands of the agency; the Board, with its
new category; the FCC, with its affirmance of the pliable intent
standard. Finally, it is essential to note that the Board, for all its
confused verbiage on intent, made one clear statement in Fox
River-that the misstatements at issue there were not "mate-
rial."'1 8 7 The FCC, too, concluded its discussion of the case with
this: ". . . We are convinced that the record does not support a
finding of significant misconduct."' 188 Arguably the bottom line
in both was nothing other than materiality.
V. AFTER Fox RIVER: RIVERSIDE AND THE
DESIGNATION PROBLEM
Most FCC misrepresentation cases begin with petitions to
deny-pleadings filed by "[a]ny party in interest" opposing the
grant of a license. 8 9 Under Section 309(d) of the Communica-
tions Act, the petition "shall contain specific allegations of fact"
showing that the petitioner is a party in interest and that a grant
of the application would be "prima facie inconsistent" with the
public interest.'90 The petitioner must also supply an affidavit
"of a person or persons with personal knowledge" of the allega-
tions.' 9' Section 309(e) provides that if "a substantial and mate-
rial question of fact is presented," or if the agency "for any
reason" is unable to make a finding as to whether the public
interest would be served by granting the application, the Com-
mission shall designate the application for hearing.1
92
In requiring that petitions contain "specific allegations of
fact" and that hearings be designated on the basis of "substantial
and material questions" of fact, Congress indicated that "allega-
tion[s] of ultimate, conclusionary facts or more general allega-
186. Id.
187. 88 F.C.C.2d at 1142, 50 R.R.2d at 1329.
188. 93 F.C.C.2d at 129, 53 R.R.2d at 46.
189. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1962).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1983).
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tions on information and belief. . . [would not be] sufficient."' 193
Thus, petitions to deny must raise "substantial and specific alle-
gations of fact, if true, would indicate that a grant of the applica-
tion would be prima facie inconsistent with the public
interest."'
194
Because of the seriousness of the charge, the FCC properly
declines to designate misrepresentation issues on a casual basis.
Petitioners' duty "to come forward with a prima facie showing
of deception" is thus "particularly strong where a misrepresenta-
tion issue is sought."1 95 Such petitions must contain not only an
affidavit of personal knowledge, but "sufficient concrete facts,
free of surmise. ' 196 The Review Board has added that "[t]he
petitioner must also make a demonstration of a desire, motive,
or logical reason to mislead in order to have an issue added,"
and that the Commission "will not infer actual or attempted de-
ceptions or improper motives from an enumeration of alleged
application errors, omissions, or inconsistencies, accompanied
by speculation and surmise but lacking factual support."
' 197
In a 1983 case, Riverside Broadcasting Co., Inc.,198 a citizens
group filed a petition to deny, urging that the Commission desig-
nate a renewal application for hearing on a misrepresentation
issue. The renewal applicant had recently purchased an existing
FM station; in seeking FCC authorization for the transfer, the
purchaser had stated that it would continue the station's jazz
format. Soon after the FCC approved the transfer, the new li-
censee changed the format to country-western. When the new
licensee sought license renewal, a pro-jazz citizens group argued
that the representations in the transfer application had been in-
tentionally false-that the purchaser even then had decided to
change the format. Accompanying the petition to deny was an
affidavit of a former station employee who asserted personal
193. S. REP. No. 590, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959), quoted in Stone v. FCC, 466
F.2d 316, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
194. Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d at 322.
195. Scott and Davis Enterprises, Inc., 88 F.C.C.2d 1090, 1099, 50 R.R.2d 1251,
1258 (Rev. Bd. 1982).
196. Garrett, Andrews & Letizia, Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d 1172, 1176, 49 R.R.2d 1001,
1004 (Rev. Bd. 1981), modified on other grounds, 88 F.C.C.2d 620, 50 R.R.2d 802
(1981).
197. Scott & Davis Enterprises, Inc., supra n.194.
198. 53 R.R.2d 1154 (1983), affid, 56 R.R.2d 618 (1984).
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knowledge that the format change was decided in advance of the
filing of the transfer application, and other evidence related to
the alleged misrepresentation. 199
In declining to designate the issue, the FCC provided the
customary justification for such action-that the petition failed
to raise the requisite "substantial and material question of
fact.' '200 But the Commission went a considerable step further,
and gave content to that requirement, stating explicitly what a
petition to deny must establish in its pleading:
The burden of proof to show misrepresentation is on the accuser
and the evidence of such must be "clear, precise and indubitable."
Overmyer Communications Co., Inc., et al., 56 F.C.C.2d 918, 925
(1974), quoting Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 13, 52
(1927). The burden has not been met here. The bulk of petitioners'
"evidence" consists of speculation based on the actions of the licen-
see which the petitioners believe shows a plan to deceive the Com-
mission and the public. However, the petitioners' speculation is
unsupported by external evidence necessary to show intent to
deceive. 2
°0
This formulation is problematic for a number of reasons.
First, its source is an Administrative Law Judge's decision in
Overmyer, where the ALJ himself qualified the "clear, precise,
indubitable" standard by calling it a "legal catchword," which
"demands more verbally than in fact."20 2  The ALJ added:
it means no more than the evidence must be reasonably
"1203convincing. Second, on review of the ALJ's decision in
Overmyer, the Review Board reversed the ALJ on the standard
of proof: "A finding of fraudulent misrepresentation may be
founded upon a less stringent standard, namely, the preponder-
ance of the evidence. ' ' 204 Third, regardless of the ALJ's fuzzy
explanation of the standard, and the fact that it was reversed, the
ALJ in Overmyer applied it to the evidence adduced at a hear-
ing-not to the allegations set forth at the prehearing stage of a
199. 53 R.R.2d at 1156-57.
200. 53 R.R.2d at 1158.
201. 53 R.R.2d at 1157.
202. Overmyer Communications Co., Inc., 56 F.C.C.2d 918, 920 n.4 (1974) (Sup-
plemental Initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge).
203. Id.




Aside from these considerable problems with Overmyer as a
precedent, the Riverside formulation has other infirmities.. It re-
quires not simply that a petitioner make a "prima facie" showing
that designation of a misrepresentation issue is warranted, but
that the petitioner essentially prove the allegations in the plead-
ing. If the Communications Act-which itself refers to a "prima
facie" showing 206-had contemplated such a role for petitions to
deny, it would hardly have provided for the designation of issues
for hearing.
Moreover, not only must the petitioner effectively prove its
allegations, it must do so by "external evidence." 207 This is a
clear reference to the ALJ's requirement in Overmyer that mis-
representation be established by "affirmative evidence of mali-
cious intent. ' 20 8 It is highly doubtful that, at the stage of a
petition to deny, a petitioner would have access to "external evi-
dence" amounting to "clear, precise and indubitable" proof of
misrepresentation, in any but the rarest of cases. This require-
ment of a "smoking pistol" to be proffered in a petition to deny,
while perhaps meant to screen out frivolous claims, may do
away with meritorious claims as well.
A final problem, related to the discussion of Overmyer
above, is that the Riverside formulation illogically puts a burden
on petitioners which exceeds that of litigants at hearing. As dis-
cussed earlier,2o 9 in Steadman v. SEC, a case which the FCC
itself has found to be applicable to its adjudications, the Supreme
Court established the burden of proof in hearings under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act as "preponderance of the evi-
dence. ' 210  The "clear, precise, indubitable" formula is
traditionally synonymous with a standard of "clear and compel-
ling proof, '211 which requires a stronger measure of belief on the
part of the trier of fact than "preponderance of the evidence."
205. 56 F.C.C.2d 918.
206. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1982).
207. 53 R.R.2d at 1157.
208. 56 F.C.C.2d at 925.
209. See supra Section III at 33.
210. 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
211. McBaine, Burden of Proof- Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 242, 253
(1944) ("Many phrases have been coined to express this amount of persuasion, or
degree of belief, ag., 'clear cogent and convincing,' 'clear satisfactory and convincing,'
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Perhaps the Commission's message in Riverside was that its
evidentiary standard in misrepresentation cases, all along, has
been the "clear, precise, indubitable" standard. While that may
well have been the guiding standard in the minds of agency deci-
sion-makers, the "preponderance of the evidence" standard has
been invoked as the rule.212 Moreover, regardless of the stan-
dard for hearings, it makes little sense to impose that same bur-
den on a petition to deny.
The Riverside formulation, if taken seriously by the Com-
mission, may well relegate misrepresentation claims to the
unenviable status of claims of news distortion, slanting, or stag-
ing. In the latter cases, "extrinsic evidence" of intentional news
distortion is required before the FCC will take any action;
213
with few exceptions, such "extrinsic evidence"-inside memo-
randa admitting distortion-is completely unavailable to peti-
tioners.214  With the discredited Overmyer standard now
resurrected, with its "external evidence" requirement, and its in-
sistence on "clear, precise, indubitable" proof for petitioners to
deny, the FCC may well have fashioned the ultimate "mode" for
evading misrepresentation charges.
VI. CONCLUSION AND A PROPOSAL
The history of misrepresentation before the FCC is a com-
plex story of the exercise of administrative discretion. Seeking to
deter the submission of erroneous information, the FCC an-
nounced early in its history that a finding of intentional decep-
tion would trigger disqualification. This approach emerged
despite indications in cases such as WSAL and WOKO that the
policies of ensuring accuracy in the administrative process, and
'clear precise and indubitable,' 'clear and irresistible,' 'convincing beyond reasonable
controversy,' etc.").
212. See Lewel Broadcasting Co., 86 F.C.C.2d 896, 914, 49 R.R.2d 871, 886
(1981).
213. See, e.g., Letter to Hon. Harley 0. Staggers, 25 R.R.2d 413 (1972); CBS
("Hunger in America"), 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 17 R.R.2d 674 (1969).
214. It is a rare phenomenon indeed for outsiders to obtain internal memoranda of
the kind seemingly required by the FCC. Although it can happen, e.g., Gross Tele-
casting, Inc., 92 F.C.C.2d 209, 223-26, 52 R.R.2d 851, 865-67 (Rev. Bd. 1982) (citizen
group obtains internal station memorandum requiring cessation of certain coverage),
Professor Keeton's remark in the context of the tort of misrepresentation is highly
applicable: ". . . it would be monstrous to require direct proof or something in the
nature of an admission of bad faith." Keeton, supra note 51, at 584.
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the licensing of responsible individuals, could also warrant sanc-
tions for unintended falsity. In the following decades, it seems
that the agency recognized that its linkage of intentional decep-
tion with disqualification was too rigid and severe-essentially,
that some lies should not disqualify. At any time, the Commis-
sion could have made this understandable viewpoint explicit.
Instead, it chose another path: to retain the framework of intent
and the policy that intent to deceive of any kind would trigger
disqualification, all the while developing ways to resist a finding
of such mental state and thus imposition of the "death
penalty.
21 5
With no definition of factors to be considered in each case,
the decision-maker applying the intent test had discretion to im-
bue the inquiry with whatever considerations seemed useful or
convenient at the time. To be sure, some applicants and licen-
sees, egregious in their behavior, were disqualified. But others
were not, likely raising doubts among the regulated as to the
seriousness of the regulators. Moreover, the test led to general
unpredictability of result and at least an impression of arbitrari-
ness from case to case-or from agency level to agency level in
the same case. The acknowledgement that some misstatements
may be "unconscious" was a perceptive insight, but the agency
offered no guidance for making such distinctions, if indeed they
can ever be reliably made, particularly within the limitations of a
licensing bureaucracy. Finally, the latest development-the
agency's strict requirements for petitions under Section 309-
may well have the effect of discouraging meritorious claims
which cannot be verified by "external evidence" of mental state
in the absence of discovery and a hearing. The result: continu-
ing submission of inaccurate information to the agency which
has not struck upon a way to discourage such conduct.
Can a solution be found? Clearly yes, if the agency agrees
to create a new standard of liability, and then establish an appro-
priate new set of sanctions. First, "misrepresentation" should be
redefined, dispensing with "intent to deceive" as the cornerstone
215. This history should sound a cautionary note to other agencies. But see Lay-
erty, To Reach the Unreachable: Recent Interpretations of the Phrase "Material False
Statement" in the Atomic Energy Act, 36 AD. L. REv. 171 (1983) (proposing, inter
alia, a scienter requirement for revocation proceedings involving false statements sub-
nitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
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of the agency's analysis. Not only is the intent test saddled with
a history of far too subjective applications, but, more impor-
tantly, it underserves the policies-first enunciated in Mayflower
over forty years ago-of promoting accuracy in the administra-
tive process and licensing reliable individuals to the airwaves. In
a revamped approach, the FCC would affirm those goals by stat-
ing a duty of accuracy 216 on the part of all who appear before it.
The focus would completely shift-from the mind of the individ-
ual to the content of the individual's submissions. If the submis-
sions are accurate, there is nothing to fear; if materially
inaccurate, the agency would take appropriate steps, regardless
of the individual's mental state.
In probing charges of misinformation, the agency would
first determine whether a submission is inaccurate. "Inaccu-
racy" would embrace both statements which are affirmatively er-
roneous, and those which are erroneous by omission. The
agency would then consider whether the inaccuracy was mate-
rial. Definitions of materiality are abundant in administrative
law; a workable definition for the FCC would be that the inaccu-
rate information is material: (1) if its effect was to impede or
prevent agency awareness of an infringement of FCC rule or pol-
icy; (2) if its effect was to obtain an advantage or avoid a disad-
vantage in the initial licensing processes of the FCC or in the
renewal context, or (3) if, in the event the misinformation had
gone undetected, it would have had the effects of (1) or (2).
Gone would be the mystifying discussions of mental state-the
"incipient lack of candor," the "faulty shading of recollection,"
the "element of hocus pocus"-which have too long cluttered
the F.C.C. Reports.
This brings us to the second step of the suggested new ap-
proach-the sanction. On a finding of materially inaccurate in-
formation, the agency would impose an established sanction. A
single materially inaccurate statement made in response to an
agency inquiry, not in a hearing context, would automatically
216. Cf Green, The Duty to Give Accurate Information, 12 UCLA L. REv. 464
(1965) (professionals should be held to a standard of accuracy rather than duty of
care). Although Section 312(a) of the Communications Act includes a scienter re-
quirement, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1982), that section applies to revocations and does not
bind the agency to a scienter test for misinformation in other contexts. In fact, Section
312(a) is virtually never cited as authority for FCC action in misrepresentation cases
outside the revocation context.
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trigger a substantial fine (say, $20,000). For the same offense,
committed during a hearing, the offender would pay the estab-
lished fine to the agency, as well as attorneys' fees of the hearing
parties incurred as a result of the misinformation. A series or
pattern of materially inaccurate statements, in either a hearing
or non-hearing context, would subject one to fines and
disqualification.
The effect of such an approach would be to liberate the
Commission from the problem of a vague standard connected to
a mostly unthinkable sanction. An approach based on imposing
a heavy fine for supplying materially inaccurate information-
instead of disqualification, which is always threatened but rarelyimposed-would not reduce industry's incentive to be truthful,
but rather signal the agency's readiness to take definite measures
based on an objective assessment of the information provided.
Moreover, the threat of disqualification would remain for those
whose materially inaccurate statements became a recognizable
pattern. Through such an approach, the FCC would be truer to
its underlying interests. It would put a premium on accuracy,
regardless of mental state. And it would make the point that
"character" involves the broad notion of responsibility rather
than state of mind.
Allegations of materially inaccurate statements would be
presented in a petition to deny in the context of an application,
or a Notice of Violation if otherwise. On a showing of a "sub-
stantial and material fact" as to whether the misinformation is
materially inaccurate, the Commission would designate an issue
for hearing. The ALJ would find facts and make conclusions of
law, based on the preponderance of the evidence, as to both inac-
curacy and materiality. Ideally, the Review Board's standard of
review would be the "substantial evidence" standard of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,2 17 not the de novo review of the past;
but even with de novo review, the Board would be subject to the
same objective standard as the ALJ and results would not vary
217. See Central Texas Broadcasting Co., Ltd., 90 F.C.C.2d 583, 597, 51 R.R.2d
1478, 1488 (Rev. Bd. 1982) (sep. statement of Member Jacobs) (when the Review
Board reviews an AU decision, "affirmance is mandated so long as the resolution of
an issue is not 'arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion. . . [or] unsupported
by substantial evidence,'" citing 5 U.S.C. § 706).
Number 3]
454 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol.37
significantly. The full FCC would become involved only upon
grant of an application for review, as under current practice.
As the FCC continues its agenda of deregulation into the
mid-1980s, it will still require information from its licensees.
Thus, it must find a way to foster the submission of current in-
formation, so that correct decisions can be made. With the new
approach suggested here, the FCC, in an era of bold and asser-
tive deregulatory measures, can be equally bold and assertive in
demanding that its licensees be accurate in the remaining areas
where they are accountable to government.
